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Patents are peculiar legal instruments in that they contain both technical and 
legal information. This Janus-like nature of the documents is important because 
they serve the legal purpose of affording the owner the right to exclude others from 
practicing the invention, and third parties need to be able to assess the scope of 
that right. At the same time, through the patent’s disclosure, the document is 
intended to contribute to the storehouse of technical knowledge. Superficially, 
patents are generally viewed through the eyes of the hypothetical person having 
ordinary skill in the art (PHOSITA), patent law’s “reasonable person.” 
Unfortunately, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has marginalized 
the PHOSITA by treating the document, particularly in claim construction and in 
assessing the sufficiency of the patent’s disclosure, as a purely legal document. 
While this shift is understandable, it is also unfortunate. Possible justifications for 
the court’s move are unpersuasive. For instance, from the ex ante perspective, the 
court may hope to encourage future applicants to provide better disclosures. As 
this Article explains, that argument fails because the court’s legal standards are 
too vague and the lapse of time between the application and a competitor’s review 
                                                                                                                 
 
 † Copyright © 2011 Timothy R. Holbrook. 
 *  Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law. Earlier versions of this paper 
were presented at the Southeastern Association of Law Schools 2010 Annual Conference 
and at the intellectual property workshop at George Washington University Law School. 
Thanks for comments and discussions on the ideas in this Article from Chris Holman, 
Namon Huddleston, Mark Lemley, Lee Petherbridge, Andrew Torrance, David Schwartz, 
and Sean Seymore. Thanks for outstanding research assistance by Nilay Choksi, Franklin 
Chu, and Lance Hochhauser. All errors are my own. 
780 INDIANA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 86:779 
 
of the patent causes informational asymmetries for which the applicant cannot 
account. From an ex post perspective, this shift may assist lay judges and juries in 
evaluating patents, but such a result is the problem—this treatment reduces the 
technical value of the patent and incentivizes future applicants to treat the 
disclosure in a legal fashion, not as a technical resource.  
To balance the interest in public notice with the technical nature of the patent, 
this Article posits the use of presumptions. Courts should use the intrinsic 
evidence—the patent and the prosecution history—to generate a presumptive 
conclusion as to the construction of the patent or the sufficiency of the patent’s 
disclosure. Then, the court should resort to the extrinsic evidence to determine 
whether the legalistic conclusion reached should be rejected in light of the 
understanding of technologists in the relevant field. In this way, the default position 
for courts is interpretation afforded by the intrinsic record, enhancing public 
notice. This default, however, can be rebutted when facts regarding the technical 
import of the document are brought to bear, bringing the viewpoint of the 
PHOSITA into the calculus.  
INTRODUCTION 
Patents are peculiar legal instruments. A patent affords a patent owner the right 
to exclude others from making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing the 
invention.1 The scope of these exclusive rights is determined by the patent’s claims, 
single-sentence elaborations of the invention found at the end of the patent.2 It 
therefore is a legal document as it sets the metes and bounds of the owner’s 
exclusionary rights. 
Yet, a patent is far more than a legal document like a contract or will. The patent 
must contain enough information to allow a person of ordinary skill in the relevant 
technology to make and use the invention.3 Moreover, the patent claims often 
contain technical language that would be unintelligible to a non–technically trained 
lawyer.4 Patents, therefore, are also technical documents, containing information of 
interest to technologists and scientists. In fact, one of the key purposes of the patent 
system is to enhance the storehouse of technical knowledge, leading to further 
innovation.5 
                                                                                                                 
 
 1. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2006). 
 2. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2. 
 3. Id. ¶ 1. See generally Jeanne C. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, 94 IOWA L. REV. 539, 
545–47 (2009) [hereinafter Fromer, Patent Disclosure]; Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in 
Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 127–31 (2006) [hereinafter Holbrook, Possession]; 
Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1142–59 (2008); Sean B. Seymore, Heightened Enablement in 
the Unpredictable Arts, 56 UCLA L. REV. 127, 129–31 (2008) [hereinafter Seymore, 
Heightened Enablement]. 
 4. See generally Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 9–17 
(2010) (describing district court judges’ struggles with technology aspects of patent law). 
 5. See, e.g., United States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 186 (1933) (“An 
inventor deprives the public of nothing which it enjoyed before his discovery, but gives 
something of value to the community by adding to the sum of human knowledge.”). But see 
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As a result of patents’ Janus-like nature, reading and interpreting them can be 
challenging, as courts must parse both the legal and the technical to arrive at a 
conclusion about the scope and validity of the patent. To mediate a patent’s dual 
nature, the patent statute and common law have developed an analog to tort law’s 
“reasonable person”: the “person having ordinary skill in the art,”6 generally 
referred to as the PHOSITA.7 In almost every area of patent law, the court or jury 
should view the issues from the perspective of the PHOSITA, not that of a lawyer 
or layperson. Consequently, the description in a patent need not include 
information already known by the PHOSITA, which permits applicants to submit 
simpler patent disclosures.8 Similarly, other patentability requirements, such as 
novelty9 and non-obviousness,10 are assessed through a technically based 
perspective.11 Whether a given device infringes a patent is also determined by 
considering the perspective of the PHOSITA.12 The PHOSITA, whoever she may 
be, is ubiquitous in patent law. 
Within the judicial system, however, no one is truly a PHOSITA. Patent 
litigation cases are tried in front of judges and juries who seldom have technical 
degrees at all, let alone one relevant to the particular patent at issue. Even at the 
national court of appeals that hears all cases arising under the patent laws, the U.S. 
                                                                                                                 
Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 
2007, 2023–26 (2005) (rejecting the view that patent disclosures disseminate technical 
knowledge). 
 6. 35 U.S.C. §§ 103, 112; Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 
17, 37 (1997) (comparing tort’s “reasonable person” to patent law’s person skilled in the art).  
 7. See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Is Patent Law Technology-Specific?, 
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1155, 1185–90 (2002); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy 
Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1648–51 (2003); Jonathan J. Darrow, The 
Neglected Dimension of Patent Law’s PHOSITA Standard, 23 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 227 
(2009); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the 
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 885 (2004); Joseph P. Meara, Just Who Is 
the Person Having Ordinary Skill the Art? Patent Law’s Mysterious Personage, 77 WASH. L. 
REV. 267 (2002); John O. Tresansky, PHOSITA—The Ubiquitous and Enigmatic Person in 
Patent Law, 73 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 37, 37–38 (1991). 
 8. See, e.g., Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 
F.2d 1452, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984). But see ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharms., LLC, 603 F.3d 
935, 941 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 9. An invention must be new in order to be patented. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–02. The 
absence of novelty results in the claimed invention being anticipated. See, e.g., Lewmar 
Marine, Inc. v. Barient, Inc., 827 F.2d 744, 747 (Fed. Cir. 1987). See generally Timothy R. 
Holbrook, The More Things Change, the More They Stay the Same: Implications of Pfaff v. 
Wells Electronics, Inc. and the Quest for Predictability in the On-Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 933, 936–37 (2000); Sean B. Seymore, Rethinking Novelty in Patent Law, 60 
DUKE L.J. 919, 930–37 (2010). 
 10. 35 U.S.C. § 103; Holbrook, supra note 9, at 937. 
 11. See Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc., 501 F.3d 1254, 1256–57 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(concluding that the level of ordinary skill was determinative of obviousness); see also 
Timothy R. Holbrook, Equivalency and Patent Law’s Possession Paradox, 23 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1, 8–9 (2009) [hereinafter Holbrook, Paradox] (discussing the relationship between 
disclosure and PHOSITA). 
 12. Sundance, Inc. v. DeMonte Fabricating Ltd., 550 F.3d 1356, 1361 n.3 (Fed. Cir. 
2008); Darrow, supra note 7, at 236; Holbrook, Paradox, supra note 11, at 21–27. 
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Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit,13 most of the judges are not technically 
trained or did not have prior patent experience.14 The PHOSITA construct, rooted 
in the scientific or technical, can be difficult for the courts to apply. 
Unsurprisingly, the Federal Circuit over time has discounted the role of the 
PHOSITA.15 In reviewing the patent document, the court has emphasized the 
document itself and the relevant patent’s prosecution history, the public record of 
the patent application process at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO or 
PTO).16 If this publicly available intrinsic evidence is clear, the court will refuse to 
consult other extrinsic evidence, which would be where the technological context 
of the invention would be revealed. The court favors the intrinsic evidence as a 
mechanism for enhancing public notice.17 The intrinsic evidence is accessible to all 
parties and is not subject to the influence of the litigation process. By emphasizing 
the patent document in isolation, the Federal Circuit has increasingly viewed 
patents as merely legal, not technical, texts.18 To effect this approach, the court has 
articulated a variety of formalistic legal rules19 that are far more accessible to a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 13. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1). See generally Holmes Grp., Inc. v. Vornado Air Circulation 
Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826 (2002). 
 14. Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent 
System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1068–69 (2003). Of the judges currently on the 
Federal Circuit, five have technical backgrounds and/or had patent experience prior to 
joining the bench: Judges Newman, Lourie, Gajarsa, Linn, and Moore. See UNITED STATES 
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov (follow “The 
Court: Judges” hyperlink). Judge Rader served on the Senate Subcommittee that dealt with 
intellectual property policy issues. See id. Judge O’Malley, while not having a technical 
degree, does have considerable experience as a district court judge trying patent cases. See 
id. Judge Dyk and nominee Edward DuMont litigated patent cases prior to their 
appointments. See, e.g., TiVo, Inc. v. EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 516 F.3d 1290 (Fed. Cir. 
2008) (nominee DuMont), vacated and reh’g en banc granted, No. 2009-1374, 2010 WL 
1948577 (Fed. Cir. May 14, 2010); Exxon Chem. Patents, Inc. v. Lubrizol Corp., 64 F.3d 
1553 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Judge Dyk). The final pending nominee, Jimmie V. Reyna, has 
neither a technical degree nor patent litigation experience. See Jimmy V. Reyna, 
WILLIAMSMULLEN, http://www.williamsmullen.com/jreyna. He does have extensive 
international trade experience, over which the Federal Circuit has jurisdiction. In contrast, 
examiners at the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office do have technical backgrounds. See 
Patent Examiner Positions, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
http://usptocareers.gov/Pages/PEPositions/Default.aspx. 
 15. Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 889–97 (discussing the marginalization of PHOSITA in 
the obviousness context).  
 16. See Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en 
banc). 
 17. See Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of Patents, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 51, 79–82 (2010).  
 18. Cf. Markman, 52 F.3d at 978–79 (“Moreover, competitors should be able to rest 
assured . . . that a judge, trained in the law, will similarly analyze the text of the patent and 
its associated public record and apply the established rules of construction, and in that way 
arrive at the true and consistent scope of the patent owner’s rights to be given legal effect.”). 
 19. See John F. Duffy, Rules and Standards on the Forefront of Patentability, 51 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 609, 611 (2009); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Supreme Court’s Complicity in 
Federal Circuit Formalism, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 2 (2003) 
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layperson but minimize the importance of the patent’s technical component.20 Thus, 
while paying lip service to her continued importance, the Federal Circuit has 
actually attempted to speak the death of the PHOSITA. 
In contrast, the U.S. Supreme Court believes that the reports of the PHOSITA’s 
death are greatly exaggerated.21 In the context of assessing whether an invention 
claimed in a patent is non-obvious, and thus worthy of patent protection, the 
Supreme Court recently breathed new life into the PHOSITA.22 Elsewhere, the 
Supreme Court has rejected the Federal Circuit’s formalism in favor of more 
flexible procedural rules. In particular, the Supreme Court has offered a variety of 
presumption-based rules that balance interests in certainty and fairness.23 
Unfortunately, the Federal Circuit has not taken these lessons to heart with respect 
to its treatment of the patent document itself.  
Patent scholarship has failed to take full account of the Federal Circuit’s 
systemic efforts to emasculate the PHOSITA in the context of the patent document 
itself. This Article fills this gap in the literature by performing a comprehensive 
review of the manner in which the Federal Circuit has marginalized the 
PHOSITA’s role as it relates to the patent document, particularly in the manner the 
court construes patent claims and assesses the sufficiency of patent disclosures, 
generally known as the written description and enablement requirements.24 The 
Article posits that the removal of the PHOSITA’s viewpoint of the patent document 
is unfortunate because it transforms the patent inappropriately into a purely legal 
document, when in fact that patent is a blend of the technical and the legal. This 
shift has the unintended result of undermining the disclosure function of the patent 
system.  
In response to this problem, this Article offers a novel methodology to balance 
the Federal Circuit’s interest in certainty with the important consideration of the 
technical aspects of the patent document. I posit that the use of rebuttable 
presumptions can balance the interest in certainty with an appropriate place for the 
PHOSITA. Presumptions allow the court to establish a default position that reflects 
its policy preference, here preferring reliance on the patent document and public 
record over extrinsic, technological evidence. Unlike the status quo, however, the 
intrinsic evidence is not necessarily determinative; the presumptive outcome from 
consideration of the intrinsic evidence can be rebutted by persuasive technology-
based evidence. Absent such evidence, the intrinsic evidence would govern the 
outcome. In this way, courts would afford primacy to the patent document while 
still providing the opportunity for the views of the PHOSITA to be considered in 
the inquiry.  
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I.A explores the nature 
of the patent document, detailing how it is both legal and technical in nature. In 
                                                                                                                 
[hereinafter Holbrook, Complicity]; Nard, supra note 17, at 77–99; Rai, supra note 14, at 
1103–22; John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 792 
(2003).  
 20. See Lee, supra note 4, at 29−41. 
 21. With all respect due to Mark Twain. 
 22. See infra Part II.A. 
 23. See infra Part II.A. 
 24. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc).  
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subpart B, I elaborate the Federal Circuit’s inappropriate discounting of the 
PHOSITA in the context of claim construction and the requirements for an 
adequate patent disclosure. Subpart C then considers potential justifications for the 
Federal Circuit’s approach by considering its ex ante and ex post consequences. 
From the ex ante perspective, the Federal Circuit could be attempting to create a 
penalty default that encourages more robust disclosures from patent applicants. The 
temporal dynamic of the patent system, however, creates various information 
asymmetries that suggest the court will not achieve this goal. From the ex post 
perspective, the court could apply a heuristic to aid laypersons in engaging with 
patent law. This rationalization, however, is the problem: the removal of the 
technical components of the disclosure from its appropriate place in the patent 
document. Ultimately I reject these possible defenses of the Federal Circuit’s 
approach.  
Part II.A then considers the contrasting approach of the Supreme Court in 
balancing the concerns of certainty and fairness. In particular, I explore how the 
Supreme Court has both emphasized the role of the PHOSITA and preferred the 
use of presumptions to balance the potential competing interests of public notice 
and fairness. Subpart B then explores the theoretical aspects of presumptions and 
concludes that such a methodology meshes well with the patent law fabric. Subpart 
C then offers a particularized rebuttable presumption framework for addressing the 
construction of patent claims and for assessing the adequacy of the patent’s 
disclosure. Subpart D finally considers possible limitations and drawbacks to the 
presumption methodology. Notwithstanding some potential hurdles, I conclude that 
the use of rebuttable presumptions provides an effective method for balancing the 
legal aspect of the patent document with the technical, improving public notice for 
the patent system.  
I. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S ELEVATION OF THE PATENT DISCLOSURE  
AND DISCOUNTING OF THE PHOSITA 
Almost every doctrine in patent law is tethered to the PHOSITA in some 
fashion. In large part, the reliance on the PHOSITA is necessary given the nature of 
the patent document, which has both legal and technical aspects. The Federal 
Circuit, however, has elevated the legal aspect to preeminence, relegating the 
technical aspect—and the PHOSITA—to second-class status. The court’s embrace 
of formalistic legal rules that focus strictly on the patent document is tied directly 
to its interest in promoting interest and certainty in patent law, but it results in an 
over-discounting of the views of technologists, as represented in the PHOSITA 
construct. This Part explores the legal and technical nature of patents and the 
Federal Circuit’s unsurprising yet unfortunate preference for treating them as 
primarily legal documents.  
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A. The Janus-Like Nature of the Patent—Technical, Legal, or Both? 
Patents are fairly unique forms of property in that they serve a constitutional, 
utilitarian purpose: to promote the progress of the useful arts.25 The award of a 
patent is therefore about more than simply rewarding the inventor for his creation; 
it also benefits the public by publishing the invention in the patent document. In 
exchange for the patent, the inventor is obligated to disclose how to make and use 
the claimed invention.26 As a result, while the patent is undeniably a legal 
document (it affords the patentee the right to exclude others from practicing her 
invention), it is also a technical document (it teaches technical details of the 
invention to the relevant public).27 
The legal aspect of the patent becomes apparent when construing the patent’s 
claims. In patent law, the scope of the right to exclude afforded by the patent is 
determined by the patent’s claims.28 A claim acts as the metaphorical “fence” that 
determines the scope of the patentee right.29 The claim, therefore, is the essential 
feature of the patent used to assess both validity30 and infringement.31 For 
determining infringement and validity of the claims, therefore, one must determine 
the meaning of the language in the claim.32 The act of interpreting the claims 
therefore delineates the legal limits of the right to exclude.  
Even a cursory perusal of a patent on a simple technology confirms that these 
documents also contain technical information. For example, a patent that covers the 
insulating sleeve on paper coffee cups contains the summary of the invention: 
 This invention provides recyclable, corrugated containers and container 
holders which can be made from existing cellulosic materials, such as 
                                                                                                                 
 
 25. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. See generally Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied 
Limits on the Legislative Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint 
on Congress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119 (discussing the Constitutional purpose and limits of 
the Patent and Copyright Clause); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Treaty Power and the Patent 
Clause: Are There Limits on the United States’ Ability to Harmonize?, 22 CARDOZO ARTS & 
ENT. L.J. 1, 4–21 (2004) (discussing potential Constitutional limits on patent law).  
 26. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006). 
 27. Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 
624 (2010) [hereinafter Seymore, Teaching Function]; FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE 
INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY ch. 4, at 
3–4 (2003). 
 28. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 2 (“The specification shall conclude with one or more claims 
particularly pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention.”). 
 29. See Holbrook, Paradox, supra note 11, at 8–9.  
 30. Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd., 357 F.3d 1319, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (noting that validity is determined on a claim-by-claim basis).  
 31. Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 
2001) (noting that infringement is assessed on a claim-by-claim basis). 
 32. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Dana Corp. 
v. Am. Axle & Mfg., 279 F.3d 1372, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[A] court may not invalidate 
the claims of a patent without construing the disputed limitations of the claims and applying 
them to the allegedly invalidating acts.”). 
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paper. The preferred recyclable, corrugated hot beverage container 
includes a lip and an internal cavity for containing a hot or cold 
medium. The container includes fluting means, such as fluting 
adhesively attached to one or more liners, for thermally spacing the 
hands of the user from the harsh temperatures of the contents of the 
container.33 
Even a patent on the relatively straightforward insulating sleeve is rife with 
technical jargon. Far more complex technologies of course involve far more 
technical disclosures.34 Thus, it is unsurprising that in order to prosecute patents at 
the USPTO, a patent attorney or agent must have a qualifying technical degree.35 
Patent examiners at the USPTO also are required to have technical degrees.36 As a 
result, patents necessarily involve technical information.  
Review of the literature on patent disclosures confirms that patents are a 
somewhat bizarre mix of the technical and legal, with commentators advocating a 
myriad of preferences for one or the other. For example, Professor Sean Seymore 
argues that the patent document should take on an even more technical character, 
bridging the gap between patents and more traditional forms of scientific 
publication and making the patent document a more effectual teacher to 
technologists.37 In his view, the patent document at present is undervalued as a 
source of technical information. The legalistic “patentese” undermines the 
document’s effectiveness as a technical disclosure yet does little seemingly to 
enhance its legal nature.38 Instead of treating a patent increasingly as a purely legal 
document, he argues that it should take on a greater technical nature by, for 
example, requiring working embodiments of the invention.39 
                                                                                                                 
 
 33. U.S. Patent No. 5,205,473 col.1 ll.44–52 (issued Apr. 27, 1993).  
 34. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,716,827 col.2 ll.41–57 (issued Feb. 10, 1998). 
Methods resulting in the isolation of substantially homogenous compositions of 
human hematopoietic stem cells are provided. The methods employ a 
predetermined separation regimen and bioassays for establishing the generation 
of each of the hematopoietic lineages from the isolated cells. The human stem 
cells find use: (1) in regenerating the hematopoietic system of a host deficient 
in stem cells, (2) in a host that is diseased and can be treated by removal of 
bone marrow, isolation of stem cells and treatment of individuals with drugs or 
irradiation prior to re-engraftment of stem cells, (3) producing various 
hematopoietic cells, (4) detecting and evaluating growth factors relevant to 
stem cell self-regeneration; (5) the development of hematopoietic cell lineages 
and assaying for factors associated with hematopoietic development; and (6) 
treatment of genetic diseases through gene replacement in autologous stem 
cells. 
Id. 
 35. 37 C.F.R. § 11.7. 
 36. See supra note 14. 
 37. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 27, at 641–57. 
 38. Id. at 633–41. 
 39. Id. at 641–46. 
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Similarly, Professor Jeanne Fromer has expressly noted that the patent document 
has two audiences, the technical and the legal.40 Notwithstanding her belief that 
patents represent the best source of technical information,41 she recognizes that 
many technologists do not read the patent disclosure due to the “legalized 
jargon.”42 Similar to Professor Seymore, she advocates an enhanced role for the 
patent document and would separate the technical from the legal to better effect the 
disclosure function of patents.43 
Professor Joseph Miller also has advocated enhancing the technical component 
of the patent document to improve the interpretation of patents.44 As he explains, 
“augmenting the patentee’s technological disclosure with carefully selected 
contextualizing information should help courts more reliably identify disputed 
claim terms’ technologically proper meanings.”45 Professor Miller would create a 
strong default position based on the ordinary meaning of a term in the relevant art. 
He proposes that the USPTO require not only the enhanced technical disclosures 
but also particularized definitions of key relevant terms.46 
In contrast, Professor John Golden has advocated a partial retreat from viewing 
the patent as a technical document in favor of recognizing its more legal nature.47 
At least with respect to the interpretation of a patent’s claims, Professor Golden 
advocates for an approach that expressly considers the view of a patent attorney, 
not merely the PHOSITA.48 Thus he would emphasize the legal nature of the 
document, informed in part by relevant technological considerations.  
Patents themselves, the law, and the literature all confirm that the nature of the 
patent document is a strange mix of the legal and the technical. Of course, the 
entity with the most authority in regulating the dichotomous nature of the patent 
document is primarily a legal actor: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal 
Circuit, which hears all patent appeals arising under the United States’ patent 
laws.49 As a result, the court has shifted the emphasis of the patent toward the legal 
and away from the technical.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 40. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, supra note 3, at 543. 
 41. Id. at 560 (“By process of elimination, the patent document is the principal way for 
an interested technologist to locate useful information about a patented invention.”). But see 
Holbrook, Possession, supra note 3, at 143–46 (arguing that patents are a poor source of 
technical information due to limits on use and delays in publication).  
 42. Fromer, Patent Disclosure, supra note 3, at 560–61. 
 43. Id. at 563–85. 
 44. Joseph Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim Construction, 
9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 177, 187–88 (2005). 
 45. Id. at 188. 
 46. Id. at 203–07. 
 47. John M. Golden, Construing Patent Claims According to Their “Interpretive 
Community”: A Call for an Attorney-Plus-Artisan Perspective, 21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 321, 
327 (2008).  
 48. Id. at 383–85. 
 49. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1295(a)(1), 1338(a) (2006). 
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B. The Federal Circuit’s Treatment of the Patent as Legal  
for Purposes of Public Notice 
Patents, unlike tangible property, do have a problem: their inchoate nature 
renders defining the boundaries of the property right difficult.50 Indeed, scholars 
have decried the lack of public notice as one of the significant failings of the patent 
system.51 The Federal Circuit has long recognized the need for certainty and public 
notice in the patent system.52 As a result, the court has tended to adopt somewhat 
formalistic, bright-line legal rules in various areas of patent doctrine.53 This interest 
in public notice, though, begs the question of notice as to whom?54 Who is the 
relevant public? Unsurprisingly, as a judicial and legal actor, the Federal Circuit 
has generally directed its efforts at public notice to lawyers, elevating the patent 
document and public record as a legal instrument and marginalizing its technical 
component, in essence by removing the PHOSITA from active participation in the 
resolution of certain issues.55 This dynamic is particularly apparent in the Federal 
                                                                                                                 
 
 50. See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Fence Posts or Sign Posts? Rethinking Patent 
Claim Construction, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1743, 1748–61 (2009) [hereinafter Burk & Lemley, 
Fence Posts]; Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries, and Patent Cases—An Empirical Peek 
Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 365 (2000); David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes 
Perfect? An Empirical Study of Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 
MICH. L. REV. 223, 227–29 (2008). Because an invention may be something new, it may be 
difficult to find words to adequately capture the idea, further compounding the boundary 
delineation problem. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 
731 (2002); Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. CHI. L. Rev. 719, 737, 
755 (2009). 
 51. JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 46−72 (2008); Craig Allen Nard, A 
Theory of Claim Interpretation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 12–14 (2000). 
 52. See In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 994 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc) (Newman, J., 
dissenting) (discussing uncertainty surrounding court’s standard for patent-eligible subject 
matter), aff’d, Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010); Group One, Ltd. v. Hallmark Cards, 
Inc., 254 F.3d 1041, 1046–47 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing need for certainty in the on-sale 
bar); Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 586 (Fed. Cir. 
2000) (en banc) (discussing reliance on public record to effect public notice), vacated & 
remanded, 535 U.S. 722 (2002); Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455–56 
(Fed. Cir. 1998) (en banc) (discussing need for certainty in claim construction). 
 53. See, e.g., Electromotive Div. of Gen. Motors Corp. v. Transp. Sys. Div. of Gen. 
Elec., 417 F.3d 1203, 1214–15 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (elevating two out of thirteen factors, control 
and customer awareness, as necessary to find experimental use). See generally Holbrook, 
Complicity, supra note 19, at 2–3; Thomas, supra note 19, at 781–83.  
 54. There is a dearth in the literature about patent law’s audience. See generally Mark 
D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience(s) (Jan. 11, 2011) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author).  
 55. See, e.g., Group One, 254 F.3d at 1047 (setting standard for “on-sale bar” under 35 
U.S.C. § 102(b) as formal commercial offer as defined by contract law). But see Timothy R. 
Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: Assessing Patent Infringement for Offering to 
Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar and Other Forms of 
Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 782–83 (2003) (arguing standard is wrong 
because it is directed to lawyers, not technologists).  
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Circuit’s jurisprudence in two key areas: the interpretation of a patent claim and the 
sufficiency of a patent’s disclosure.56  
1. The Primacy of the Patent Document and  
Prosecution History in Claim Construction 
The determination of the scope of a patent depends upon the interpretation of the 
patent’s claims, which informs both infringement and validity analyses. Disputes 
over the patent claims, therefore, are central in nearly every patent case.57 Because 
claims are actually abstract representations of the invention, they are rife with 
uncertainty.58 Considerable effort in litigation is therefore devoted to the process of 
claim construction.59 The baseline principle for interpreting a word in a claim is 
that its meaning is assessed not from a lay perspective, but instead from that of the 
PHOSITA, giving the term its ordinary and customary meaning in the art.60 A 
patent applicant can act as her own lexicographer, however, affording a term with a 
definition different from its customary one.61 Both of these assessments are taken 
from the perspective of the PHOSITA.62 One would think, therefore, that an 
important part of the interpretive process would be evaluating how a technologist in 
the field would interpret the term. 
The Federal Circuit, however, has marginalized greatly the role of the 
PHOSITA in construing patent claims. In construing a claim, the Federal Circuit 
requires a court to first consider the intrinsic evidence, which consists of the claims 
themselves (both asserted and unasserted), the specification, and the prosecution 
history (which is the record of the application process at the USPTO), all of which 
are in the public domain.63 Only if this evidence is ambiguous is it appropriate to 
resort to extrinsic evidence, such as dictionaries, prior art not in the prosecution 
history, treatises, experts, and the inventor.64 
By creating this preference for the intrinsic evidence, the Federal Circuit hopes 
to promote public notice.65 The evidence considered most relevant is that readily 
                                                                                                                 
 
 56. Admittedly, these two doctrines can be related, as the scope of the disclosure 
informs the appropriate scope of the claims. See generally Holbrook, Paradox, supra note 
11, at 8–15. 
 57. See Burk & Lemley, Fence Posts, supra note 50, at 1750. 
 58. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 
(2002) (“[T]he nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of a thing in a 
patent application.”); BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 51, at 56–61; Burk & Lemley, Fence 
Posts, supra note 50, at 1751–61. 
 59. See generally KIMBERLY A. MOORE, PAUL R. MICHEL & TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK, 
PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY 322–23 (3d ed. 2008).  
 60. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312–13 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 61. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 62. Home Diagnostics, Inc. v. LifeScan, Inc., 381 F.3d 1352, 1355–56 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 63. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314; Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583; Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 978–79 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
 64. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584. 
 65. Id. at 1583 (“[C]ompetitors are entitled to review the public record, apply the 
established rules of claim construction, ascertain the scope of the patentee’s claimed 
invention and, thus, design around the claimed invention. Allowing the public record to be 
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available to any member of the public. As the patent is theoretically a self-
contained document, with sufficient information in the specification to practice the 
invention, the resort to extrinsic evidence would seem inappropriate.66 The problem 
is, however, that federal judges—even those on the Federal Circuit—are not 
persons of ordinary skill in the art. They are lawyers, not technologists.67 While the 
Federal Circuit has noted that extrinsic evidence may be taken to educate the 
judge,68 the court has made clear that it is error to rely on such evidence if the 
intrinsic evidence is unambiguous.69 The court rejected one methodology that 
would have given substantial consideration to dictionaries, which could provide 
insight as to the ordinary meaning of a term from the perspective of the 
PHOSITA.70 Unsurprisingly, the focus on the more legal, intrinsic evidence would 
be favored by those trained in the law and not necessarily in the sciences.71 
                                                                                                                 
altered or changed by extrinsic evidence introduced at trial, such as expert testimony, would 
make this right meaningless.” (citation omitted)). 
 66. Markman, 52 F.3d at 978 (“The patent is a fully integrated written instrument.”). 
 67. See supra note 14. 
 68. Markman, 52 F.3d at 980–81; Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318. In Pitney Bowes, Inc. v. 
Hewlett-Packard Co., the court clarified Vitronics by explaining: 
Despite the district court’s statements to the contrary, Vitronics does not 
prohibit courts from examining extrinsic evidence, even when the patent 
document is itself clear. Moreover, Vitronics does not set forth any rules 
regarding the admissibility of expert testimony into evidence. Certainly, there 
are no prohibitions in Vitronics on courts hearing evidence from experts. 
Rather, Vitronics merely warned courts not to rely on extrinsic evidence in 
claim construction to contradict the meaning of claims discernible from 
thoughtful examination of the claims, the written description, and the 
prosecution history—the intrinsic evidence. 
182 F.3d 1298, 1308 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citations and footnote omitted). 
 69. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1584. 
 70. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1320–22 (rejecting the methodology of Tex. Digital Sys., Inc. 
v. Telegenix, Inc., 308 F.3d 1193 (Fed. Cir. 2002)). 
 71. The Federal Circuit appears ready to reconsider its standard of review for claim 
construction. See, e.g., Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. eSpeed, Inc., 595 F.3d 1340, 1350–51 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (now-Chief Judge Rader criticizing the de novo standard of review); Amgen 
Inc. v. Hoechst Marion Roussel, Inc., 469 F.3d 1039 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc) (declining en 
banc reconsideration of de novo review with several dissents and concurrences); see also 
Trading Techs., 595 F.3d at 1363–64 (Clark, J., concurring) (district court judge sitting by 
designation, criticizing de novo review). Prior to recent judges taking senior status or 
retiring, there seemed to be a sufficient number of judges willing to reconsider the issue en 
banc. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 59, at 261 (counting number of Federal Circuit judges 
willing to reconsider the de novo standard). With Judges Schall and Mayer taking senior 
status in 2009 and 2010, respectively, and Judge Michel retiring altogether in 2010, the 
ability of the court to reconsider the issue en banc will depend on the new judges. Federal 
Circuit Judge O’Malley, a former district court judge, has criticized the de novo standard. 
See Kathleen M. O’Malley, Patti Saris & Ronald H. Whyte, A Panel Discussion: Claim 
Construction from the Perspective of the District Judge, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 680 
(2004) (Judge O’Malley stated, “If we are going to receive evidence from experts in order to 
determine those things, it is a hard pill to swallow as a district judge that, after seeing the 
experts, and hearing the experts, our efforts to answer those questions are subject to a 
completely de novo review and a blank record. It is difficult to accept that there is no 
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Moreover, the court has taken to using representations made in the specification 
against the patentee.72 A patentee is free to be her own lexicographer, providing 
unique definitions to words that vary from the customary and ordinary meaning in 
the relevant technological art.73 Such a rule is not troubling when the patent 
applicant has offered an express definition of the term: she knows that the public 
will rely on that definition and not some other found outside of the patent 
document.74 The problem arises, however, when the Federal Circuit concludes that 
the patentee has implicitly provided a definition, which generally arises in the 
specification when the applicant distinguishes earlier technologies from the claimed 
invention75 or provides only one version of the patented invention.76 In this context, 
the court has nevertheless concluded that the applicant has surrendered subject 
matter, in essence provided a definition implicitly about what the invention is not.77 
The court finds this surrender, however, without considering whether the 
PHOSITA would read the same language as giving up subject matter; instead, the 
court is applying a legal idea—estoppel—to preclude the patentee from obtaining 
coverage for something that she gave up from the perspective of a lawyer.78  
The Federal Circuit effectively has jettisoned the perspective of the PHOSITA 
from the claim construction analysis.79 Moreover, as claim construction is usually 
dispositive of literal infringement,80 absent factual issues about the device or 
                                                                                                                 
deference given to that factual decision making.” (emphasis in original)). 
  Even if the Federal Circuit changes the standard of review, however, it will not 
eliminate the problem if the court persists in giving primacy to the intrinsic evidence. Indeed, 
it is quite possible that deference to the factual extrinsic evidence will not alter the oft-
criticized reversal rates because, on appeal, the court can simply rely on the intrinsic 
evidence, to be reviewed de novo anyway, and ignore extrinsic evidence if it is inconsistent 
with the intrinsic evidence. See Markman, 52 F.3d at 997–98 (Mayer, J., concurring) 
(arguing for contract-like analysis, with intrinsic evidence treated as legal and extrinsic 
evidence as factual).  
 72. See, e.g., CCS Fitness, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 
2002); SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1345–
47 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Toro Co. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 199 F.3d 1295, 1301 (Fed. Cir. 
1999). 
 73. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582. 
 74. See, e.g., Trading Techs., 595 F.3d at 1353. 
 75. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (“[T]he specification may reveal an intentional 
disclaimer, or disavowal, of claim scope by the inventor. In that instance as well, the 
inventor has dictated the correct claim scope, and the inventor’s intention, as expressed in 
the specification, is regarded as dispositive.”); SciMed, 242 F.3d at 1345–47. 
 76. See, e.g., Nystrom v. TREX Co., 424 F.3d 1136, 1143–46 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(construing term “board” as limited to boards made of wood).  
 77. See Miller, supra note 44, at 205–06 (recognizing and criticizing such implied 
definitions).  
 78. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Substantive Versus Process-Based Formalism in Claim 
Construction, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 123, 142 (2005) [hereinafter Holbrook, Claim 
Construction]. 
 79. See Holbrook, Possession, supra note 3, at 160. 
 80. Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Hunt-Wesson, Inc., 103 F.3d 978, 983 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Where 
the parties do not dispute any relevant facts regarding the accused product . . . but disagree 
over possible claim interpretations, the question of literal infringement collapses into claim 
construction and is amenable to summary judgment.”); see also Jeanne C. Fromer, 
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method accused of infringing the patent, the court has also removed the PHOSITA 
from the literal infringement inquiry as well. 
2. The Written Description Requirement Replaces the PHOSITA’s Judgment  
With That of the Judge 
Claim construction is not the only area in which the Federal Circuit has 
marginalized the PHOSITA to the point of near irrelevance. More recently, and far 
more greatly underappreciated in the literature, the Federal Circuit has removed 
considerations of the PHOSITA from assessing the sufficiency of patent 
disclosures under the written description and enablement doctrines.81 This assault 
on the technical is particularly egregious in this context because it directly threatens 
the types of disclosures that patent drafters will make in crafting the application. If 
the courts treat the specification as legal, then drafters will have incentives to 
reduce the technical aspect of the document in favor of creating a more legalistic 
text.82  
In exchange for the grant of a patent’s exclusive rights, a patentee must disclose 
her invention to the public. The courts view the quid pro quo aspect of patents as 
crucial because it forces the applicant to disclose information about the invention to 
the public.83 The disclosure obligations are governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1, 
which states in relevant part:  
 The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, 
and of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, 
clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art 
to which it pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make 
and use the same . . . .84 
Contained within this somewhat opaque language are two requirements according 
to the Federal Circuit: the patent must contain a written description of the invention 
and information sufficient to enable the PHOSITA to make and use the invention.85 
Importantly, in contrast to the law of claim construction and infringement, the 
statute specifically references the importance of the PHOSITA by referencing “any 
person skilled in the art.” Notwithstanding this express statutory provision, the 
Federal Circuit over time has minimized the importance of the PHOSITA in the 
area of patent disclosures. 
This trend of elevating the disclosure over the knowledge of the PHOSITA has 
its genesis in the law of written description, the dispute over which has been much 
discussed in the case law and literature.86 The written description historically and 
                                                                                                                 
Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1469−72 (2010). 
 81. See infra notes 86–159 and accompanying text. 
 82. See Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 27, at 633–41. 
 83. Holbrook, Possession, supra note 3, at 131–32.  
 84. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006). 
 85. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc). But see id. at 1369 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
 86. For case law, see, e.g., LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 
1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2005); In re Wallach, 378 F.3d 1330, 1334–35 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Regents of the 
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uncontroversially acted to prohibit an applicant from adding new matter to the 
patent application.87 Applicants cannot supplement an application with new 
material without forfeiting the benefit of an earlier filing date.88 If an earlier-filed 
application contains sufficient support for material found in a later application, then 
the applicant is entitled to priority of the earlier application, potentially permitting 
her to avoid invalidating prior art.89 To show adequate support, the specification of 
the earlier application must demonstrate that the inventor possessed the subject 
matter claimed in the later application.90 Similarly, within a given application, the 
doctrine acted to constrain an applicant’s attempts to amend a claim that would 
effectively add new matter to that application.91 In that context, the amended claim 
would be invalid as improperly adding new matter to the application. Thus, the 
written description requirement “functions to ensure that all claims amended or 
                                                                                                                 
Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997). See also Univ. of Rochester 
v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1307–08 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, J., dissenting from 
declination of en banc consideration) (“In 1997, this court for the first time applied the written 
description language of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 as a general disclosure requirement in place of 
enablement, rather than in its traditional role as a doctrine to prevent applicants from adding new 
inventions to an older disclosure. . . . Neither Eli Lilly nor this case has explained either the legal 
basis for this new validity requirement or the standard for ‘adequate support.”’); id. at 1325–27 
(Linn, J., dissenting from declining rehearing en banc). For commentary, see, e.g., Duane M. 
Linstrom, Spontaneous Mutation: A Sudden Change in the Evolution of the Written Description 
Requirement as it Applies to Genetic Patents, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 947, 970 (2003); Janice M. 
Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written Description Requirement to Biotechnological 
Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615, 617 (1998) [hereinafter Mueller, Evolving Application]; 
Harris A. Pitlick, The Mutation on the Description Requirement Gene, 80 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK 
OFF. SOC’Y 209, 222–23 (1998); Harold C. Wegner, When a Written Description Is Not a “Written 
Description”: When Enzo Says It’s Not, 12 FED. CIR. B.J. 271, 274 (2002); Jennifer L. Davis, 
Comment, The Test of Primary Cloning: A New Approach to the Written Description Requirement 
in Biotechnological Patents, 20 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 469, 487–88 (2004). 
 87. Anascape, Ltd. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 601 F.3d 1333, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“To 
obtain the benefit of the filing date of a parent application, the claims of the later-filed 
application must be supported by the written description in the parent ‘in sufficient detail 
that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that the inventor invented the claimed 
invention as of the filing date sought.’”); see also id. at 1342 (Gajarsa, J., concurring) 
(“Here, the majority’s opinion demonstrates a good example in applying the written 
description in a priority policing context, while leaving invalidity in the capable hands of the 
enablement doctrine. Though Ariad makes clear that written description is not confined to 
the priority policing context, I continue to believe such confinement, while not statutorily 
mandated, streamlines litigation and arguably reconciles some of our written description and 
enablement precedent.”); In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990, 995–96 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (holding that 
when an applicant attempts to claim specific chemical compounds which were broadly 
disclosed, the question is not enablement, but “whether the specification discloses the 
compound . . . specifically, as something [the applicant] actually invented”). 
 88. 35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 132(a) (2006).  
 89. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 90. Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“To meet [the written 
description] requirement, the disclosure of the earlier application, the parent, must 
reasonably convey to one of skill in the art that the inventor possessed the later-claimed 
subject matter at the time the parent application was filed.”). 
 91. In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d at 995–96.  
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added after the filing date of the application find adequate ‘support’ in the 
originally filed application.”92 
In recent years, the Federal Circuit has expanded the doctrine to provide a basis 
for invalidating a claim even absent priority or new matter concerns. The inventor 
must demonstrate sufficient support in the specification to justify the scope of the 
claim by showing that the inventor was in possession of the entirety of the claimed 
invention; broad, generic claims tend to be particularly vulnerable to challenge 
under the written description doctrine.93 In order to satisfy this aspect of the written 
description requirement, an applicant must disclose within the patent document 
support to show that the inventor was in possession of the invention, and 
particularly the entirety of the broad, generic claim.94 The inventor can do so by, 
for example, listing a sufficient number of species to justify protection for an entire 
class of inventions or identifying common structural or functional aspects of the 
invention that would permit broad generalization and extrapolation as to the scope 
of the invention.95 How many disclosed species or functional generalizations are 
sufficient is unclear and likely depends on the technology.96  
This expanded form of the written description requirement originally arose in 
the context of biotechnology inventions.97 In particular, early gene patents claimed 
cDNA sequences based not on the DNA structures themselves, but instead on the 
proteins coded by those DNA sequences.98 Given the redundancy of the genetic 
code, such a claiming technique had the potential to allow one patent to cover 
millions of DNA sequences.99 Similarly, claiming “vertebrate” or “mammalian” 
cDNA generically was too broad when the patent only disclosed a particular 
species’ (rats) cDNA sequence.100 Over time, the Federal Circuit has loosened this 
obligation as to biotechnology patents as technology has evolved, allowing, for 
                                                                                                                 
 
 92. JANICE M. MUELLER, PATENT LAW 123 (3d. ed. 2009).  
 93. See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
banc); LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
 94. See LizardTech, 424 F.3d at 1346; Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
119 F.3d 1559, 1568−69 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 95. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1350, 1352−53. 
 96. Id. at 1351 (“The law must be applied to each invention at the time it enters the 
patent process, for each patented advance has a novel relationship with the state of the art 
from which it emerges. Thus, we do not try here to predict and adjudicate all the factual 
scenarios to which the written description requirement could be applied. Nor do we set out 
any bright-line rules governing, for example, the number of species that must be disclosed to 
describe a genus claim, as this number necessarily changes with each invention, and it 
changes with progress in a field.”). 
 97. See generally Janice M. Mueller, The Evolving Application of the Written 
Description Requirement to Biotechnological Inventions, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 615 
(1998) (exploring the written description requirement’s unique impact on biotechnology and 
characterizing it as a super enablement requirement). 
 98. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567. 
 99. Cf. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1558 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“A prior art disclosure of the 
amino acid sequence of a protein does not necessarily render particular DNA molecules 
encoding the protein obvious because the redundancy of the genetic code permits one to 
hypothesize an enormous number of DNA sequences coding for the protein.”). 
 100. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567−68. 
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example, claiming in terms of function if one of skill in the art would know the set 
of structures that would perform that function.101 Moreover, the court more recently 
has applied the requirement outside of the biotech area, including sofa design102 
and computer software.103 In Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.,104 
the en banc Federal Circuit confirmed that written description is a separate basis for 
invalidating patent claims and made clear that the doctrine applies equally to all 
technologies and not specifically to biotech or other, early-stage inventions.105 
The use of the written description in this fashion has been harshly criticized, 
both by judges on the court and commentators, as a standardless requirement that 
effectively grants the Federal Circuit discretion to strike down claims that it simply 
believes are too broad, regardless of what someone in the technological field might 
think.106 Many view the requirement as redundant of the enablement requirement107 
and, indeed, have called it a “super-enablement” requirement,108 although the 
Federal Circuit rejected this characterization.109  
                                                                                                                 
 
 101. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 964 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (adopting PTO 
Guideline that “the written description requirement can be met by ‘show[ing] that an invention is 
complete by disclosure of sufficiently detailed, relevant identifying characteristics . . . i.e., complete 
or partial structure, other physical and/or chemical properties, functional characteristics when 
coupled with a known or disclosed correlation between function and structure, or some 
combination of such characteristics’” (alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (quoting 
Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications Under the 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1, “Written 
Description” Requirement, 66 Fed. Reg. 1099, 1106 (Jan. 5, 2001))). 
 102. Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479–80 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 103. LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1343–47 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 104. 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
 105. Id. at 1352 (“It also has not just been applied to chemical and biological 
inventions.”). 
 106. See LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (Rader, J., dissenting); Davis, supra note 86, at 487–88 (“[T]he court has not issued 
clear and consistent standards.”); Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding Cats: Contending with 
the “Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure Doctrines), 2 
WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 62–71 (2000); Duane M. Linstrom, Spontaneous Mutation: A 
Sudden Change in the Evolution of the Written Description Requirement as It Applies to 
Genetic Patents, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 947, 970 (2003) (“[I]t has also left us with even 
more uncertainty in the law than before the ruling.”); Mueller, supra note 97, at 617; Pitlick, 
supra note 86, at 222; Arti K. Rai, Intellectual Property Rights in Biotechnology: Addressing 
New Technology, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 827, 830–31 (1999); Wegner, supra note 86, at 
274. But see Lefstin, supra note 3, at 1215–22. 
 107. Holbrook, Possession, supra note 3, at 161–63; Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly 
Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly 
and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 80 (2007) (arguing that 
the courts have failed to articulate a standard for compliance with written description which 
is distinct from enablement); Wegner, supra note 86, at 271. 
 108. Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Rader, 
J., concurring) (“[T]he only way to distinguish the Lilly rule from enablement is to construe Lilly as 
requiring more disclosure than necessary to enable one of skill in the art to make and use the 
invention, a ‘super-enablement’ standard.”); Mueller, supra note 97, at 617. 
 109. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en 
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What is striking about the development of the court’s written description 
jurisprudence is that the court rarely, if ever, ventures outside the four corners of 
the patent document to account for the PHOSITA’s perspective.110 By focusing 
exclusively on the patent specification only, the court has removed the PHOSITA 
from the inquiry, notwithstanding its statements that one determines whether the 
written description requirement is satisfied from the perspective of the PHOSITA. 
The court does not resort to extrinsic, technical information but instead merely sees 
a broad, generic claim, reviews the specification to see how many species or 
correlations are disclosed, and then concludes whether the court believes there is 
adequate support. 
3. The Federal Circuit Has Marginalized the PHOSITA in the Enablement Analysis 
While the controversy surrounding the written description requirement has been 
well documented in the case law and the literature, culminating in Ariad, the 
literature has failed to recognize that the Federal Circuit has subtly remolded 
enablement doctrine to be virtually identical to the law of written description.111 As 
a result, even in this incredibly fact-intensive inquiry, the court has removed the 
viewpoint of the PHOSITA in considering whether the patent adequately enables 
the claimed invention.112 This dynamic is particularly striking given the express 
statutory mandate in § 112 that enablement must be assessed from the viewpoint of 
a person skilled in the art. 
The enablement disclosure obligation ensures that others will be able to practice 
the invention based strictly on the patent disclosure once the patent expires. 
Because the patent is published upon issuance (and indeed many applications are 
published after eighteen months),113 the enabling disclosure also serves to enhance 
the storehouse of knowledge before the patent expires.114 Others can review the 
document and, while unable to practice the invention without the patentee’s 
permission, can utilize the information therein to generate further advancements or 
improvements.115 
                                                                                                                 
banc) (“We also reject the characterization, cited by Ariad, of the court’s written description 
doctrine as a ‘super enablement’ standard for chemical and biotechnology inventions.”). The 
court has recognized that there is a relationship between the two doctrines. LizardTech, Inc. 
v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 1344–45 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (observing that 
written description and enablement are “closely related” and “usually rise and fall together”). 
 110. See, e.g., Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1355 (rejecting patentee’s expert testimony as “legally 
irrelevant”); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 925–26 (Fed. Cir. 
2004) (rejecting patentee’s expert testimony and relying solely on specification to invalidate 
the claim).  
 111. See infra notes 124−59 and accompanying text. 
 112. See infra notes 124−59 and accompanying text. 
 113. 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (2006).  
 114. See Fromer, Patent Disclosure, supra note 3, at 553; Holbrook, Possession, supra 
note 3, at 131; Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 27, at 624; Katherine J. Strandburg, 
What Does the Public Get? Experimental Use and the Patent Bargain, 2004 WISC. L. REV. 
81, 91.  
 115. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) (explaining that the 
information disclosed in the patent adds to the public storehouse of knowledge). 
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Historically, the courts recognized that enablement is a highly fact-intensive 
inquiry, depending on a variety of factors tied directly to the PHOSITA.116 
Specifically, if the PHOSITA can make and use the invention without undue 
experimentation, then the claimed invention is enabled.117 By using the perspective 
of the PHOSITA, the law did not require an applicant to include information that is 
already well known in the art, permitting simplification of the patent document.118 
In measuring the sufficiency of the specification, therefore, the courts should take 
into account both the knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art and the content 
of the patent specification.119 As the Federal Circuit has noted, “the artisan’s 
knowledge of the prior art and routine experimentation can often fill gaps, 
interpolate between embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate beyond the 
disclosed embodiments, depending upon the predictability of the art.”120 Some 
experimentation, therefore, does not preclude a conclusion that the claimed 
invention is enabled.121 The courts have identified a number of factors relevant to 
assessing whether any experimentation would be undue:  
1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, 
2) the amount of direction or guidance presented, 
3) the presence or absence of working examples, 
4) the nature of the invention, 
5) the state of the prior art, 
6) the relative skill of those in the art, 
7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, and 
8) the breadth of the claims.122 
While the enablement requirement is conceptually simple, it is a complicated, fact-
intensive inquiry. Further adding to the doctrine’s complexity, it is an ever-moving 
target: as the knowledge of the PHOSITA grows over time, an identical disclosure 
may shift from not being enabled to being enabled.123  
Although the Federal Circuit has highlighted that the assessment of enablement 
must include both the knowledge of one of skill in the art and the patent’s 
specification, recent cases have elevated the role of the specification and sharply 
discounted the importance of the PHOSITA’s knowledge. Beginning in Genentech, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 116. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 736–37 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Lindemann Maschinenfabrik GMBH v. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co., 730 F.2d 1452, 
1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 119. Nat’l Recovery Techs., Inc. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 
(Fed. Cir. 1999) (“The scope of enablement, in turn, is that which is disclosed in the 
specification plus the scope of what would be known to one of ordinary skill in the art 
without undue experimentation.”). 
 120. AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
 121. Wands, 858 F.2d at 736–37. 
 122. Id. at 737. 
 123. Holbrook, Possession, supra note 3, at 129–30; see also Holbrook, Paradox, supra 
note 11, at 41–42 (discussing how knowledge of PHOSITA alters scope of enablement).  
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Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S,124 the Federal Circuit bemoaned the dearth of disclosure 
in the relevant specification: 
 It is true, as Genentech argues, that a specification need not disclose 
what is well known in the art. However, that general, oft-repeated 
statement is merely a rule of supplementation, not a substitute for a 
basic enabling disclosure. It means that the omission of minor details 
does not cause a specification to fail to meet the enablement 
requirement. However, when there is no disclosure of any specific 
starting material or of any of the conditions under which a process can 
be carried out, undue experimentation is required; there is a failure to 
meet the enablement requirement that cannot be rectified by asserting 
that all the disclosure related to the process is within the skill of the art. 
It is the specification, not the knowledge of one skilled in the art, that 
must supply the novel aspects of an invention in order to constitute 
adequate enablement. This specification provides only a starting point, 
a direction for further research.125 
This statement, however, goes too far. Nowhere in § 112 is there a separate 
obligation to disclose the “novel aspects” of the invention: the statute mandates 
only that the specification enable the claimed invention to one skilled in the art.126 
If one so skilled does not need the “novel aspects” of the invention (whatever those 
may be) in order to practice the invention, then seemingly there is no obligation to 
disclose it. 
This emphasis on the disclosure, and the discounting of the knowledge of the 
PHOSITA, has continued. For example, in AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac and Ugine,127 
the Federal Circuit confronted the situation where the specification taught away 
from a particular embodiment. The court reasoned that: 
The question more precisely here is whether, with AK Steel’s patent 
specification as an initial guide, the hypothetical skilled artisan’s 
knowledge of the surrounding art and ability to modestly experiment 
would have been sufficient to enable him to make and use a steel strip 
containing a Type 1 aluminum coating, with the claimed wetting 
attributes, at the time of the ’549 patent’s effective filing date in 1986. 
 We conclude that the specification is inadequate as a matter of law 
in that regard primarily because it expressly teaches against it. Worse 
than being silent as to that aspect of the invention, the specification 
clearly and strongly warns that such an embodiment would not wet 
well. In particular, the specification warns that silicon content above 
0.5% in the aluminum coating causes coating problems. Such a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 124. 108 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 125. Id. at 1366 (citation omitted).  
 126. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written 
description . . . of the manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, 
concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it 
pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same . . . .” 
(emphasis added)).  
 127. 344 F.3d 1234 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
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statement discourages experimentation with coatings having more than 
0.5% silicon, undue or otherwise. It tells the public that higher amounts 
of silicon will not work. Nothing further need be said about the 
matter.128 
Subsequently applying AK Steel, the Federal Circuit in Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. 
Medrad, Inc.129 invalidated a generic claim that covered two embodiments of an 
invention when the specification disparaged one of those forms.130 Specifically, the 
claim at issue covered both jacketed and jacketless syringes, and the specification 
had suggested problems with jacketless embodiments. As a result, the court held 
that “where the specification teaches against a purported aspect of an invention, 
such a teaching ‘is itself evidence that at least a significant amount of 
experimentation would have been necessary to practice the claimed invention.’”131 
In both Liebel-Flarsheim and AK Steel, the court did turn to extrinsic evidence to 
adduce whether one of skill in the art could make and use the claimed invention, 
that is, to decide whether the submitted evidence was sufficient to rebut the 
teaching away from the specification.132 Neither rested its conclusion entirely on 
the specification.  
More recent cases, however, portend a greater shift away from the knowledge of 
the PHOSITA and towards requiring disclosure of information in the specification 
that is already known to the PHOSITA. In particular, in Automotive Technologies 
International, Inc. v. BMW of North America, Inc.,133 the court noted that: 
 ATI argues that despite this limited disclosure, the knowledge of one 
skilled in the art was sufficient to supply the missing information. We 
do not agree. In Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 
1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997), we stated: “It is the specification, not the 
knowledge of one skilled in the art, that must supply the novel aspects 
of an invention in order to constitute adequate enablement.” Although 
the knowledge of one skilled in the art is indeed relevant, the novel 
aspect of an invention must be enabled in the patent. The novel aspect 
of this invention is using a velocity-type sensor for side impact 
sensing.134  
The court has continued this line of reasoning in more recent cases. The court in 
Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC135 relied upon lack of enablement to invalidate a 
generic claim on summary judgment.136 The invention allowed a user to integrate 
                                                                                                                 
 
 128. Id. at 1244.  
 129. 481 F.3d 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 130. Id. at 1379. 
 131. Id. (quoting AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 
2003)). 
 132. See Liebel-Flarsheim, 481 F.3d at 1379−80; AK Steel, 344 F.3d at 1244–45. 
 133. 501 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 134. Id. at 1283. 
 135. 516 F.3d 993 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 136. Id. at 1002. 
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her own video or audio stream into a video game.137 The district court construed the 
claims to be generic, encompassing not only video games but also movies, 
notwithstanding that the specification only described video games.138 The Federal 
Circuit affirmed the judgment of invalidity for want of enablement on this basis, 
noting that “[n]either patent specification in this case teaches how the substitution 
and integration of a user image would be accomplished in movies.”139 Only after 
reaching this conclusion did the court consider expert testimony proffered by both 
parties, relying on the defendant’s expert and rejecting the testimony of the 
patentee’s expert as conclusory, unsupported by evidence, and presented by a 
person not skilled in the relevant art of film making.140 Such weighing of the 
evidence in the context of summary judgment suggests that the court was elevating 
the patent disclosure over the extrinsic evidence. 
Similarly, the Federal Circuit affirmed a judgment of invalidity for lack of an 
enabling disclosure in ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, LLC.141 The 
invention involved an extended-release version of a drug used to treat Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).142 The claims were interpreted to cover 
both osmotic and non-osmotic versions of the drug, but the specification only 
described osmotic forms.143 The court specifically rejected the contention that the 
knowledge of the PHOSITA could be used to supplement the patent’s disclosure to 
enable the full scope of the claims as construed: 
To the extent that ALZA argues that the knowledge of a person of 
ordinary skill in the art satisfies the enablement requirement, we 
disagree. As this court has repeatedly stated, “the rule that a 
specification need not disclose what is well known in the art is ‘merely 
a rule of supplementation, not a substitute for a basic enabling 
disclosure.’” To satisfy the plain language of § 112, ¶ 1, ALZA was 
required to provide an adequate enabling disclosure in the specification; 
it cannot simply rely on the knowledge of a person of ordinary skill to 
serve as a substitute for the missing information in the specification.144 
The court faulted the specification for failing to provide nothing more than a 
starting point, thus requiring undue experimentation for the non-osmotic form.145 
Although seemingly concluding on the specification alone that the claim was not 
enabled, the court did consider the expert testimony offered, rejecting the testimony 
                                                                                                                 
 
 137. Id. at 995. 
 138. Sitrick v. Dreamworks, LLC, No. CV 03-4265-SVW (AJWx), 2006 WL 6116641, at 
*4 n.3, *33 (C.D. Cal. July 20, 2006). 
 139. Sitrick, 516 F.3d at 1000. 
 140. Id. at 1001. 
 141. 603 F.3d 935 (Fed. Cir. 2010); see also Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 
VAND. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 33−34 n.187).  
 142. ALZA, 603 F.3d at 936. 
 143. Id. at 938–39. 
 144. Id. at 940–41 (emphasis added) (quoting Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., 
501 F.3d 1274, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2007), and Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 
1361, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).  
 145. Id. at 941. 
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of the patentee’s expert given that it conflicted with other expert testimony and that 
his skill level was above that of ordinary skill.146 The court credited the evidence 
from the accused infringer that the patentee’s own employees encountered 
considerable difficulty in creating a non-osmotic version of the drug.147 
The reasoning in Automotive, Sitrick, and ALZA cannot be reconciled with the 
language of § 112, ¶ 1. The statute does not create two disclosure obligations, one 
for most aspects of the invention and a second for “novel aspects” of the invention. 
The only requirement is that a person of ordinary skill be able to make and use the 
invention. If an aspect of the invention—even a “novel aspect”—is known in the 
art, then the specification need not disclose it.148 The law had been clear that, in 
fact, the knowledge of the PHOSITA could supplement the disclosure in the patent, 
as per the statutory language.149 The knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art 
can fill in such gaps. It is not merely “relevant”: it is determinative of whether a 
claim is enabled.150 To suggest otherwise reduces the enablement inquiry into the 
identical, inappropriate reasoning used under written description. Neither 
Automotive, Sitrick, nor ALZA involved situations where there was no disclosure. 
Instead they involved claims that could cover an alternative embodiment that was 
not disclosed. There was no evidence to suggest that the particular variations were 
somehow essential to the patentability of the invention. The only question should 
have been whether one of skill in the art could have made and used the alternatives 
covered by the claim without undue experimentation. If one so skilled could have 
made an electronic sensor in lieu of a mechanical sensor (Automotive), a movie in 
lieu of a video (Sitrick), or a non-osmotic form in lieu of an osmotic form (ALZA), 
then the claims should have been enabled. The mere failure to disclose those 
alternatives should not per se invalidate those claims absent evidence of the 
knowledge of one of ordinary skill in the art. The sole inquiry is whether one of 
ordinary skill in the art could make and use the invention.  
Perversely, this line of cases in the enablement and the written description 
doctrines under Ariad now inappropriately conflate infringement with validity. The 
reason the scope of the claim becomes relevant is that the claim must be construed 
to cover the accused device. If the differences in the accused device were not 
present, then validity seemingly would not be at issue. For example, if the device in 
Automotive used mechanical sensors, which were disclosed, seemingly there would 
not have been an enablement challenge because there would not have been a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 146. Id. at 941–42. 
 147. Id. at 942.  
 148. If the novel aspect was known to the PHOSITA, then it may suggest the claim is 
invalid as lacking novelty or being obvious, but it should have no impact on whether it is 
enabled.  
 149. See Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007) 
(“[T]he specification need not necessarily describe how to make and use every embodiment 
of the invention ‘because the artisan’s knowledge of the prior art and routine 
experimentation can often fill in the gaps.’” (quoting AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac & Ugine, 344 
F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003))). 
 150. Nat’l Recovery Techs. v. Magnetic Separation Sys., Inc., 166 F.3d 1190, 1196 (Fed. 
Cir. 1999). 
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dispute over whether the patent covered mechanical sensors.151 Yet, the scope of 
the claim should not be dependent on the accused device. One wonders whether the 
litigants in Automotive, Sitrick, and ALZA could have launched an enablement-
based claim even if the accused device was precisely what was disclosed. For 
example, if the accused device in Automotive in fact used a mechanical sensor, 
could the infringer have made the same enablement challenge? Ultimately, the 
court is effectively requiring the specification to enable the accused device and not 
the claim.152 
Part of the problem is the link between claim construction, claim scope, and 
disclosure. As the Federal Circuit noted in Liebel-Flarsheim: 
 The irony of this situation is that Liebel successfully pressed to have its 
claims include a jacketless system, but, having won that battle, it then 
had to show that such a claim was fully enabled, a challenge it could 
not meet. The motto, “beware of what one asks for,” might be 
applicable here.153  
The validity of the claim, while clearly tied to claim construction, seemingly should 
not be tied to the claim construction arguments. In other words, even if the patentee 
had not asked for—nor perhaps needed to ask for—the broader construction, the 
claim should be invalid if truly not enabled or unsupported by the written 
description.154  
This linkage between the claim construction, the accused device, and the 
sufficiency of the disclosure is more than ironic, though, because of the asymmetry 
between conclusions of noninfringement and invalidity. When there is a judgment 
only of noninfringement, the consequences are between only the patentee and that 
particular infringer; the patent is still valid, enforceable against other potential 
infringers, and available to license.155 With an invalidity determination, however, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 151. The same would be true in Sitrick if the accused device was a movie instead of a 
video or in ALZA if the accused device was an osmotic form.  
 152. See Holbrook, Paradox, supra note 11, at 11. 
 153. Liebel-Flarsheim, 481 F.3d at 1380; see also ALZA Corp. v. Andrx Pharm., LLC, 
603 F.3d 935, 943 (Fed. Cir. 2010); Automotive Techs. v. BMW of N. Am., 501 F.3d 1274, 
1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
 154. See Moba, B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (Rader, J., concurring) (“This case illustrates some of the unintended consequences of 
this judge-made doctrine. Each time a claim encompasses more than the preferred 
embodiment of the invention described in the specification, a defendant can assert that the 
patent is invalid for failure to describe the entire invention. Under the expanded written 
description doctrine, every claim construction argument could conceivably give rise to a 
validity challenge as well.”). 
 155. See, e.g., Bayer AG. v. Biovail Corp., 279 F.3d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(addressing enforcement of patent previously found not infringed); see generally Glynn S. 
Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 363, 384 (2001) 
(“[F]ailing to resolve the validity issue where raised permits potentially invalid claims to 
‘remain in terrorem of the art’ and to serve as a basis for enabling the patent holder to extract 
license fees, if not monopoly rents.” (quoting Royal Typewriter Co. v. Remington Rand, 168 
F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1948))).  
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the patent is invalid as to the rest of the world, even those not involved in the 
litigation.156 Indeed, invalidity judgments have a public-good aspect because third 
parties can free ride on an invalidity determination by another without incurring the 
costs of litigation.157 Thus, it would seem more appropriate, if we do value patents, 
for the courts to err on the side of offering narrower claim constructions that may 
result in noninfringement, but nevertheless preserve validity.158 The patentee 
should not be punished merely for advocating a legal position. By adopting this 
catch-22 approach, the Federal Circuit has created an unwarranted bias against 
patents. 
Thus, in one of the most fact-intensive inquiries, where the statute mandates the 
consideration of the views of the PHOSITA, the Federal Circuit has nonetheless 
elevated the disclosure within the patent over the knowledge of the PHOSITA.159  
C. Consequences of Treating the Patent as Purely Legal 
The Federal Circuit’s marginalization of the PHOSITA seems rather odd given 
the mixed nature of the patent document. There might be reasons, however, to 
support the Court’s approach. This section weighs the advantages and 
disadvantages of the Federal Circuit’s rules. It does so by first looking at the ex 
ante consequences: how patent applicants will respond to these rules. This section 
explores how the rules could provide advantageous incentives for applicants to 
disclose additional information in their patent applications, but ultimately, given 
information asymmetries created by the temporal difference between the 
application date and the ultimate acts of infringement, concludes that the rules are 
too strict and ultimately unwarranted. Second, this section explores the ex post 
consequences: what impact these rules will have on the way the courts encounter 
and wrestle with these legal issues. Arguably, these legalistic rules minimize the 
need for judicial actors to engage with difficult issues of technology; but ultimately, 
this abdication of the courts’ role is unsatisfying and results in the courts simply 
impeding their ability to deal with these important issues.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 156. Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971); see 
also Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 100–01 (1993). 
 157. See Cardinal Chem., 508 U.S. at 101 (“As this case demonstrates, the Federal 
Circuit’s practice of routinely vacating judgments of validity after finding noninfringement 
creates a similar potential for relitigation and imposes ongoing burdens on competitors who 
are convinced that a patent has been correctly found invalid.”). See generally Joseph Scott 
Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for Defeating Patents, 19 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 677–95 (2004). 
 158. Modine Mfg. Co. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 75 F.3d 1545, 1557 (Fed. Cir. 1996); 
see also Holbrook, Claim Construction, supra note 78, at 144. But see Phillips v. AWH 
Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (“While we have acknowledged the 
maxim that claims should be construed to preserve their validity, we have not applied that 
principle broadly, and we have certainly not endorsed a regime in which validity analysis is a 
regular component of claim construction.”).  
 159. Cf. Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 27, at 653 (“More recently, various 
legal actors disagree about whether the enablement analysis should begin inwardly with the 
applicant’s disclosure or outwardly by gauging the PHOSITA’s knowledge.”).  
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1. Ex Ante Consequences: How Will Future Patent Applicants Respond? 
Patent applicants are not a static set. Drafters of applications will respond to the 
changing legal and technical landscape. The question is whether the Federal 
Circuit’s claim construction and disclosure rules will produce advantageous 
consequences for the patent system. 
The formalistic claim construction and disclosure rules articulated by the 
Federal Circuit could be viewed as information-forcing default penalties. The law 
and economics literature has long argued in favor of default rules around which 
parties can transact in the absence of normative reasons to use immutable rules.160 
In the context of default rules, Professors Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner rejected the 
normal assumption that these defaults should reflect the positions to which the 
parties would have agreed absent transaction costs.161 Recognizing that parties 
often have incentives to behave strategically and not disclose information, Ayres 
and Gertner argue for penalty defaults that function to force parties to disclose 
information during the negotiation process or risk paying the default penalty.162  
The Federal Circuit’s rules, particularly those for written description and 
enablement, can be seen as information-forcing penalty defaults. As Professor R. 
Polk Wagner has identified, patent applicants have both the incentives and 
opportunity to withhold information during the patent application process.163 They 
have reasons to provide just enough information to satisfy § 112 and no more so 
that the patentee could retain aspects of the invention as a trade secret, potentially 
providing a competitive advantage in the market even after the patent is published 
or expires.164 Moreover, given the ex parte nature of the application process, there 
is no adversarial check on the applicant’s behavior. Only the ethical obligations of 
the patent attorney or agent, coupled by the threat of the patent being rendered 
unenforceable if the attorney or agent commits inequitable conduct, provide direct 
incentives for honesty and disclosure.165 Given this incentive for the applicant to 
strategically withhold information, the Federal Circuit’s current rules could be 
viewed as penalty defaults to the patentee. If the patentee fails to disclose 
information sufficient to support the breadth of the claim they assert in litigation, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 160. Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic 
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87–88 (1989). The literature has suggested 
immutable rules are important to protect either parties to the contract who could not 
otherwise protect themselves in the negotiation, rooted in parentalism, or parties external to 
the contract, rooted in combating externalities. Id. at 88. 
 161. Id. at 90–91. 
 162. Id. at 91. 
 163. R. Polk Wagner, Reconsidering Estoppel: Patent Administration and the Failure of 
Festo, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 159, 214–16 (2002).  
 164. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 534 (1966) (noting incentive for patent 
applicants to write applications “so that they disclose as little useful information as 
possible”); Seymore, Teaching Function, supra note 27, at 634 n.62. 
 165. See USPTO Patent Application Rule, 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2009) (noting duty of candor 
and good faith to the USPTO, including duty to disclose material information). The risk of 
eventual invalidation in litigation would constrain strategic efforts, but given that so few 
patents reach litigation, that risk would be discounted significantly.  
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then the penalty is the invalidation of the claim. Thus, the patent applicant now has 
the ex ante incentive to provide a more robust disclosure.166 Because the patent 
applicant is in the best position to disclose the relevant information, she should bear 
the cost of the failure to disclose. 
Unfortunately, this view of the Federal Circuit’s doctrine is overly simplistic 
and overlooks some of the important realities of the patent prosecution process. 
First, the use of the penalty rule is question begging: part of the problem is that the 
court is finding the patent specifications inadequate when, from the viewpoint of 
the PHOSITA, they very well may be sufficient. It is possible that some of these 
disclosures might be sufficient if one were to consider how a technologist would 
view the disclosures. Thus the problem is not the failure to disclose but instead the 
failure of the courts to appreciate the disclosure. 
Additionally and relatedly, to have effective ex ante consequences, the penalty 
default rule needs to be clear for the patent applicant to make an informed decision 
of whether to expand her disclosure or to accept the risk of the punishment inherent 
in the penalty default. As the literature on written description has discussed, and as 
this Article has explained with respect to the Federal Circuit’s recent course on 
enablement, these legal standards are vague. It is difficult, if not impossible, for an 
applicant to know whether a given disclosure will indeed be sufficient.  
There are also temporal aspects to patent law that are more significant than in 
Ayres and Gertner’s contract example.167 In contract law, the parties negotiate 
contemporaneously with each other to reach an agreement. In patent law, the patent 
applicant must attempt to foresee what may happen over the course of the life of 
the patent while drafting the application. Once the patent issues, however, that 
language is frozen, and the patentee cannot alter it. In contrast, competitors have 
the advantage of hindsight, looking at the issued patent and being able to shift their 
position in light of the language of the patent, language that the applicant may not 
have intended to create the estoppel-like effect as determined by the Federal 
Circuit.168 While the patentee seemingly may have the best information about the 
invention, the temporal dynamic creates its own information asymmetry and may 
                                                                                                                 
 
 166. Cf. Wagner, supra note 163, at 216−17 (arguing for a stronger, almost absolute bar 
rule for prosecution history estoppel to force information disclosure during the patent’s 
prosecution).  
 167. This is not to say that contracts do not involve time-related complexities. Contracts 
often account for future behavior and may need to be adjusted or interpreted in light of 
changed circumstances over time during an ongoing relationship between parties. See 
generally Paul J. Gudel, Relational Contract Theory and the Concept of Exchange, 46 BUFF. 
L. REV. 763, 765 (1998). Some terms may be left intentionally ambiguous to be addressed at 
a later date. See Milton C. Regan, Jr. & Palmer T. Heenan, Supply Chains and Porous 
Boundaries: The Disaggregation of Legal Services, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2137, 2164–65 
(2010). Nevertheless, the focus on the interpretation of the contract is the intent of the parties 
at the time the contract is formed. See, e.g., Centigram Arg., S.A. v. Centigram Inc., 60 F. 
Supp. 2d 1003, 1006–07 (N.D. Cal. 1999).  
 168. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 731 
(2002) (“Unfortunately, the nature of language makes it impossible to capture the essence of 
a thing in a patent application. The inventor who chooses to patent an invention and disclose 
it to the public, rather than exploit it in secret, bears the risk that others will devote their 
efforts toward exploiting the limits of the patent’s language . . . .”). 
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place potential infringers in a better position to play around the periphery of the 
patent.169 This information asymmetry is confirmed by the fact that written 
description and enablement challenges in the cases are closely tethered to the 
accused device,170 which generally has been created after the patent issued. The 
penalty default rule approach assumes a level of foreseeability on the part of a 
patent drafter that is unreasonable. 
Moreover, to the extent that most of these cases arise from litigation and not 
from appeals from the PTO, the court’s articulation of the default penalty is too 
late. By the time the litigation reaches the Federal Circuit, the state of the art will 
have evolved, particularly in rapidly developing technologies. The rule articulated 
by the court, therefore, will be applied to relatively old technologies. Current 
applicants will be seeking protection for new technologies. As the written 
description and enablement standards are tethered, seemingly, to one of skill in the 
art, that skill has now changed. The court articulates the default penalty and 
invalidates the patent claim, punishing the litigant and potentially all extant patent 
holders who prosecuted their patents under a now invalid disclosure rule, yet those 
currently at the PTO would have a different, as of yet unarticulated, disclosure 
obligation. We thus punish the current patent holders with no benefit flowing to the 
adequacy of current applications’ disclosures. In order to work effectively as a 
penalty default, the Federal Circuit would need to articulate the rule in appeals from 
the PTO dealing with pending applications. Of course, the only way those appeals 
reach the Federal Circuit is if the PTO rejects the applications. If the PTO views the 
disclosures as sufficient, under a potentially erroneous standard, the patents will 
issue and the standard will not reach the Federal Circuit contemporaneously. The 
time lag, therefore, undermines the effectiveness of written description and 
enablement as a penalty default.  
Finally, it is not clear that the Federal Circuit’s approach is efficient. The law 
expressly now requires applicants to disclose that which is already well known in 
the art.171 By stating that the knowledge of the PHOSITA cannot supplement the 
disclosure as to the novel features of the invention, the Federal Circuit has now 
incentivized vast overdisclosure, adding cost to the drafting of patent applications 
and costs to the examiners who must examine these more voluminous applications. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 169. The doctrine of equivalents could be used to combat the asymmetry, but the Federal 
Circuit’s use of the specification in estoppel-like fashion also applies to the doctrine of 
equivalents. See, e.g., SciMed Life Sys. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 242 F.3d 1337, 
1345–47 (Fed. Cir. 2001); see also Holbrook, Paradox, supra note 11, at 26–27. If the 
patentee has surrendered literal claim scope, then almost invariably she will be precluded 
from asserting the doctrine of equivalents; thus, the traditional protection for patentees to 
combat the temporal dimension of patent law generally is unavailable to patentees in this 
situation. See, e.g., L.B. Plastics, Inc. v. Amerimax Home Prods., Inc., 499 F.3d 1303, 1309 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (“We have held that when a specification excludes certain prior art 
alternatives from the literal scope of the claims and criticizes those prior art alternatives, the 
patentee cannot then use the doctrine of equivalents to capture those alternatives.”). 
 170. See supra notes 153–59 and accompanying text.  
 171. See supra notes 133–50 and accompanying text.  
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Given that so few patents are actually litigated172 and that many are valueless,173 
increasing the upfront costs of all patent applications seems rather inefficient.  
At a minimum, the elevation of the patent document presupposes a level of 
foreseeability for a patent drafter that seems rather inappropriate. Competitors will 
always have the advantage of hindsight, reading the patent document after the fact 
and being able to find flaws in the disclosure that may not have been apparent at 
the time of the application, and particularly in light of the competitor’s own 
design.174 With the court’s tethering of claim construction and the disclosure 
doctrines, patent applicants are at an extreme disadvantage. The likely consequence 
is patents of reduced value. Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s assault on scope via the 
disclosure doctrines and the removal of the doctrine of equivalents rebuts the 
argument that the Federal Circuit is overly pro-patent. Instead, the court is pro-
validity for patents with narrow scope. 
2. Ex Post Consequences of the Federal Circuit’s Rules:  
Courts’ Engagement with Technological Facts 
Another potential justification for the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the patent 
document is ex post in nature, facilitating the ability of courts to deal with patent 
issues. By focusing on the public record, the court theoretically is reducing the 
various costs associated with reviewing the patent. The court is correct that, as a 
self-contained document, review of the patent itself (and the prosecution history) 
should be sufficient for third parties to apprise themselves of the scope of the patent 
and its teachings.  
Along these lines, Professor Peter Lee has argued that these formalistic rules are 
not terribly surprising as they operate as heuristics that help lay persons—judges 
and juries—avoid having to engage in the complex technologies involved in these 
cases.175 Thus the doctrines reduce information costs for judges and juries alike by 
transforming the technical concepts into more ordinary, or perhaps more legal, 
concepts that are more readily accessible to various judicial actors. The simpler 
legal rules “limit[] the degree to which judges must understand technologies and 
their context.”176 
Unfortunately, this advantage is ultimately its disadvantage: it confirms that the 
technical is being ignored in favor of the more familiar legal. As discussed above, 
patent drafters will have the incentive to shift the patent document to more of a 
legal discussion (assuming they can accurately predict the court’s legal rules), 
increasing the gap between patents and other forms of technical knowledge. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 172. Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 
1500–08 (2001). 
 173. See generally Kimberly A. Moore, Worthless Patents, 20 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1521 
(2005). 
 174. The use of the specification to preclude claim scope is particularly troubling in 
contrast to the use of the prosecution history because the surrender may have been 
inadvertent. Holbrook, Claim Construction, supra note 78, at 142–43. 
 175. Lee, supra note 4, at 25−41. 
 176. Id. at 41. 
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Moreover, if the court’s interest is in promoting notice, it is only promoting 
notice to lawyers. Third parties likely have persons skilled in the relevant fields to 
assist in assessing the content and scope of patents. Thus, they are more informed 
about the patent’s true teachings. Courts, in contrast, are not persons of skill in the 
art, and by limiting the relevant evidence, the Federal Circuit is actually 
handicapping their understanding. 
These harsh formalistic rules that have divorced the PHOSITA from the 
analysis, however, are not necessary to afford appropriate weight to the court’s 
policy preferences, such as public notice. As the next section shows, the Federal 
Circuit should take a cue from the Supreme Court about the importance of the 
PHOSITA and her role through the use of rebuttable presumptions. 
II. BALANCING THE LEGAL AND THE TECHNOLOGICAL—THE USE OF PRESUMPTIONS 
The tension that runs due to the dualistic nature of the patent document is of 
considerable concern. The Federal Circuit’s interest in public notice, and 
consequent elevation of the patent itself over the PHOSITA, is understandable177 
yet troubling. It ignores that documents do contain technical aspects to them, and 
that the representations made in them as a technical matter may not have the same 
import that the courts are affording them as a legal matter.  
Another court has not been as receptive to this approach as the Federal Circuit—
the U.S. Supreme Court. Review of Supreme Court patent jurisprudence counsels 
two important points that the Federal Circuit has failed to take into account. First, 
the Supreme Court’s recent foray into the law of obviousness demonstrates, and 
reinvigorates, the importance of the PHOSITA.178 Second, although the Supreme 
Court failed to apply its own methodology in the context of the obviousness 
inquiry, the Supreme Court has previously resolved the tension between public 
notice and consideration of the technical through the use of presumptions.179 
Rebuttable presumptions can be an effective way of mediating concerns of 
certainty with the technical aspect of the patent document that necessarily entails 
consideration of extrinsic evidence. These presumptions “reflect substantive policy 
choices regarding where the risk of error should lie upon completion of the very 
uncertain business of fact finding.”180 Here, the policy choice is a preference for the 
intrinsic evidence over that of the extrinsic. The default rule, therefore, is that the 
intrinsic evidence will govern the determination of issues such as claim 
construction and satisfaction of the disclosure obligations. Nevertheless, if 
sufficient extrinsic evidence is presented to show that the PHOSITA would not 
read the intrinsic evidence in such fashion, then such a presumptive view of the 
patent would be rebutted.  
                                                                                                                 
 
 177. The Supreme Court has long emphasized the public notice function of a patent. See 
McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419, 424 (1891) (“The object of the patent law in requiring 
the patentee to [distinctly claim his invention] is not only to secure to him all to which he is 
entitled, but to apprise the public of what is still open to them.”). 
 178. See infra notes 183−99 and accompanying text.  
 179. See infra notes 200−21 and accompanying text.  
 180. David L. Faigman, Madisonian Balancing: A Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 
88 NW. U. L. REV. 641, 658 (1994). 
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This section explores the Supreme Court’s take on the role of the PHOSITA and 
the use of presumptions. It then articulates a presumption-based approach to claim 
construction and evaluation of the sufficiency of the patent disclosure. By generally 
precluding resort to the extrinsic evidence absent some sort of ambiguity, the 
Federal Circuit has offered an overly formalistic approach to these issues. The 
presumption-based approaches offered here provide a better, more manageable 
method for balancing the patent document as a legal and a technical text.  
A. The Lessons (and Missed Opportunity) of the Supreme Court’s KSR Decision 
For the first twenty years of the Federal Circuit’s existence, the Supreme Court 
rarely intervened in matters of substantive patent law.181 That situation dramatically 
changed after 1997, when the Supreme Court re-entered the world of patent law.182 
One of the most significant interventions by the Supreme Court involved the law 
of obviousness. In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc.,183 the Supreme Court 
reviewed the law of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 for the first time in over 
thirty years.184 In doing so, it rejected the rather formalistic approach to the 
obviousness inquiry that the Federal Circuit had developed.185  
Prior to KSR, the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in Graham v. John Deere 
Co.186 provided the framework for analyzing the obviousness of an invention, 
providing four factors to be considered: the scope and content of the prior art, the 
differences between the prior art and the claimed invention, the level of ordinary 
skill in the art, and any relevant secondary considerations, such as commercial 
success, the failure of others, and long-felt but unsolved need.187 This determination 
allows the combination of pieces of prior art, such as looking at a scientific article 
and an earlier patent. If all of the “pieces” of the invention could be found in 
various references, then likely the invention would be viewed as obvious. The 
problem with such a construction, however, is that the patent application itself can 
serve as a roadmap; it is much easier to find the pieces when the patent lays it all 
out for the fact finder. Such hindsight reconstruction is problematic because, once 
someone has created the invention, it may seem trivial and apparent after the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 181. See Mark D. Janis, Patent Law in the Age of the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 387. 
 182. See generally John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme 
Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273; Timothy R. Holbrook, The Return of 
the Supreme Court to Patent Law, 1 AKRON INTELL. PROP. J. 1 (2007) [hereinafter Holbrook, 
Supreme Court]. 
 183. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).  
 184. The last time the Supreme Court addressed the issue of obviousness was in 1973. 
See Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273 (1976); see generally Holbrook, Complicity, 
supra note 19, at 5–9 (cataloging pre-1995 Supreme Court cases reviewing Federal Circuit 
judgments and noting a dearth of cases dealing with substantive patent law). 
 185. See Holbrook, Complicity, supra note 19, at 3; Thomas, supra note 19, at 773. 
 186. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). 
 187. Id. at 17–18. 
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fact.188 The inventive act may have been to make the combination of known 
elements.189 
Because of concern over this hindsight bias, the Federal Circuit began requiring 
some reason that would be known to one of skill in the art to make the 
combination.190 To be obvious, the prior art, the knowledge of the one skilled in the 
art, or the nature of the problem must provide a teaching, suggestion, or motivation 
(TSM) to combine relevant pieces to obtain the claimed invention.191 The Federal 
Circuit had found an invention to be non-obvious, notwithstanding the presence of 
each and every claim limitation in various pieces of prior art, simply because the 
prior art lacked a motivation to combine those references.192 Many commentators 
felt that the Federal Circuit effectively had lowered the standard of non-
obviousness, resulting in the grant and enforcement of patents on trivial 
innovations.193 
The Supreme Court agreed with these critiques and rejected application of the 
TSM in a rigid form.194 In so doing, the Supreme Court chastised the Federal 
Circuit for emasculating the PHOSITA and provided a far more vigorous view of 
her importance:  
 The second error of the Court of Appeals lay in its assumption that a 
person of ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only 
to those elements of prior art designed to solve the same problem. . . . 
Common sense teaches, however, that familiar items may have obvious 
uses beyond their primary purposes, and in many cases a person of 
ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents 
                                                                                                                 
 
 188. See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 5,194,299 (filed Dec. 31, 1986) (patent covering Post-It 
Notes®); see generally Gregory N. Mandel, Another Missed Opportunity: The Supreme 
Court’s Failure to Define Nonobviousness or Combat Hindsight Bias in KSR v. Teleflex, 12 
LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 323, 336−42 (2008) (discussing experimental studies and flaws in 
the current obviousness inquiry); Gregory N. Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious: Empirical 
Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1391 (2006) (performing experimental studies that show the presence of the hindsight bias in 
assessing the obviousness of an invention).  
 189. See Ruiz v. A.B. Chance Co., 357 F.3d 1270, 1275 (Fed. Cir. 2004); Timothy R. 
Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2160 
(2008) [hereinafter Holbrook, Extraterritoriality]. 
 190. In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 999 (Fed. Cir. 1999); In re Rouffet, 149 F.3d 1350, 
1357 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 191. Dembiczak, 175 F.3d at 999; Rouffet, 149 F.3d at 1357. 
 192. Carella v. Starlight Archery & Pro Line Co., 804 F.2d 135, 140 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see 
also Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119 Fed. App’x 282, 286–90 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (reversing 
summary judgment of invalidity based on misapplication of TSM analysis), rev’d, KSR Int’l 
Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007). 
 193. See ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 34–35 
(2004); A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 89–90 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. 
Levin & Mark B. Myers eds., 2004); FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE 
PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 6–7 (2003). 
 194. KSR, 550 U.S. at 419 (“But when a court transforms the general principle into a 
rigid rule that limits the obviousness inquiry, as the Court of Appeals did here, it errs.”). 
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together like pieces of a puzzle. . . . A person of ordinary skill is also a 
person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.195 
Commentators have noted the Supreme Court’s invigoration of the PHOSITA in 
this context.196 
The Supreme Court’s resuscitation of the PHOSITA suggests that the Court 
disagrees with the Federal Circuit’s broader efforts to remove or minimize her 
knowledge from other patent law doctrines.197 The Supreme Court nevertheless 
missed an opportunity to provide a more structured framework to balance concerns 
of notice with a role for the PHOSITA.198 As those before and after KSR have 
suggested, one appropriate way of performing this balance is through the use of 
presumptions.199 The Court need only look to its other patent law jurisprudence to 
find a tool to permit appropriate balancing: the use of presumptions. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 195. Id. at 420−21. 
 196. Darrow, supra note 7, at 248; Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, A Realistic 
Approach to the Obviousness of Inventions, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 989, 999–1004 (2008); 
Amy L. Landers, Ordinary Creativity in Patent Law: The Artist Within the Scientist, 75 MO. 
L. REV. 1, 3–4 (2010); Joseph Scott Miller, Remixing Obviousness, 16 TEX. INTELL. PROP. 
L.J. 237, 244 (2008); Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 3, at 134–35. 
 197. See Lee, supra note 4, at 42. Lee characterizes the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence as 
taking a “holistic turn,” rejecting the Federal Circuit’s rules for more standard-like analyses. 
Id. I agree with this only partially because early Supreme Court cases expressed the same 
interest in certainty as the Federal Circuit. See Holbrook, Complicity, supra note 19, at 5–9. 
Earlier cases articulated the use of presumptions to balance these interests, a methodology 
the Court unfortunately has failed to embrace as of late. See infra notes 198−221 and 
accompanying text. 
 198. Cf. Holbrook, Supreme Court, supra note 182, at 21. The Supreme Court’s more 
recent pronouncements, while rejecting the Federal Circuit’s formalism, have failed to offer 
much guidance as to their holistic approach. See Lee, supra note 4, at 63−64. 
  For example, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s bright-line rule 
regarding patent exhaustion. Under the Federal Circuit’s prior law, only unrestricted sales of 
the patented good exhausted the patentee’s exclusive rights; any limits on the right of the 
purchaser on use of the invention resulted in a license, which did not exhaust the patent 
rights. See Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 706–08 (Fed. Cir. 1992). The 
Supreme Court rejected this rule, but offered little guidance as to when exhaustion is 
triggered, noting only that “[t]he authorized sale of an article that substantially embodies a 
patent exhausts the patent holder’s rights and prevents the patent holder from invoking 
patent law to control postsale use of the article.” Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 
553 U.S. 617, 638 (2008). 
  Similarly, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s rule for assessing subject 
matter eligibility of a claimed process. The Federal Circuit required a process be “tied to a 
particular machine or apparatus” or “transform[] a particular article into a different state or 
thing.” In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 954 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), aff’d sub nom. Bilski v. 
Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010). The Supreme Court noted that the “machine-or-
transformation” test was helpful but was not the sole test; instead, it relied on vague notions 
of the unpatentability of abstract ideas, natural phenomena, and laws of nature. Bilski, 130 S. 
Ct. at 3227. 
 199. Brief for International Business Machines Corp. as Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Neither Party, KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007) (No. 04-1350), 2006 WL 
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In other patent-related cases, the Court has recognized the need for certainty but 
has also counseled against overly harsh, formalistic rules.200 In the interest of 
balancing certainty with fairness, the Court has articulated rebuttable presumptions 
in a variety of contexts. In the context of prosecution history estoppel, the Court 
has articulated two presumptions. Prosecution history estoppel is a legal limitation 
on what is known as the doctrine of equivalents, which allows the patent to cover a 
device that is not exactly the same as what is claimed but is “close enough.”201 An 
exception to this coverage may arise if, during the prosecution of the patent 
application at the USPTO, the applicant narrows a claim that would have covered 
the asserted equivalent literally but, after the amendment, no longer does.202 The 
Supreme Court has noted that “[b]y the amendment [the patentee] recognized and 
emphasized the difference between the two phrases . . . . The difference which [the 
patentee] thus disclaimed must be regarded as material.”203 
In Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,204 the Supreme Court 
concluded that this estoppel only arises when an applicant amended the claims for a 
reason related to patentability.205 The relevant prosecution history in the case, 
however, was silent as to why the applicant amended the claim. In the situation 
where the reason for the amendment is not known, the Court held that courts should 
presume such amendments were made for reasons related to patentability.206 As the 
Court reasoned: 
The presumption we have described, one subject to rebuttal if an 
appropriate reason for a required amendment is established, gives 
proper deference to the role of claims in defining an invention and 
providing public notice, and to the primacy of the PTO in ensuring that 
the claims allowed cover only subject matter that is properly patentable 
in a proffered patent application.207 
In so doing, the Court rejected a more formalistic, clearer rule—that any 
amendment created an estoppel.208 Instead, the Court created this presumption in 
                                                                                                                 
2430566, at *18 (arguing that “references should be presumed combinable by a person 
having ordinary skill in the art where the references are within the scope of the ‘analogous 
art’”; in such circumstances, there need not be a motivation to combine the references); 
Timothy R. Holbrook, Commentary, Obviousness in Patent Law and the Motivation to 
Combine: A Presumption-Based Approach, WASH. U. L. REV. SLIP OPINIONS (Mar. 21, 
2007), http://lawreview.wustl.edu/commentaries/obviousness-in-patent-law-and-the-
motivation-to-combine-a-presumption-based-approach; Miller, supra note 196, at 250−56; 
Joshua D. Sarnoff, Bilcare, KSR, Presumptions of Validity, Preliminary Relief, and 
Obviousness in Patent Law, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 995, 1000 (2008).  
 200. Cf. Holbrook, Supreme Court, supra note 182, at 9, 21−23. 
 201. See Holbrook, Paradox, supra note 11, at 14.  
 202. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 733–34 
(2002); Litton Sys., Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 140 F.3d 1449, 1462 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
 203. Exhibit Supply Co. v. Ace Patents Corp., 315 U.S. 126, 136−37 (1942). 
 204. 520 U.S. 17 (1997). 
 205. Id. at 30−32. 
 206. Id. at 33. 
 207. Id. at 33−34. 
 208. Id. at 30 (“But petitioner reaches too far in arguing that the reason for an amendment 
2011] PATENTS, PRESUMPTIONS, AND PUBLIC NOTICE 813 
 
order to demonstrate certain policy preferences—deference to the claims and 
primacy of the PTO—but did not let those preferences result in absolute rules. 
Those preferences instead are rebuttable in light of other concerns.  
The Supreme Court followed up its presumption in Warner-Jenkinson with a 
second in the context of prosecution history estoppel. In Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu 
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co.,209 the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s 
rule of prosecution history estoppel that absolutely precluded any equivalents if the 
claim was narrowed for reasons related to patentability.210 In its place, recognizing 
the need for certainty, the Supreme Court created a rebuttable presumption: by 
making a narrowing amendment for reasons related to patentability, the applicant 
presumptively has surrendered all equivalents.211 This presumption can be rebutted 
if the asserted equivalent was unforeseeable, it bore only a tangential relationship to 
the reason for the amendment, or there is some other reason that the applicant 
should not be considered to have surrendered the equivalent.212 The Court 
emphasized: 
 This presumption is not, then, just the complete bar by another name. 
Rather, it reflects the fact that the interpretation of the patent must 
begin with its literal claims, and the prosecution history is relevant to 
construing those claims. When the patentee has chosen to narrow a 
claim, courts may presume the amended text was composed with 
awareness of this rule and that the territory surrendered is not an 
equivalent of the territory claimed. In those instances, however, the 
patentee still might rebut the presumption that estoppel bars a claim of 
equivalence. The patentee must show that at the time of the amendment 
one skilled in the art could not reasonably be expected to have drafted a 
claim that would have literally encompassed the alleged equivalent.213 
The Festo presumption, therefore, places primacy on the public record, with the 
default being a complete surrender of equivalents due to the claim amendment. 
Courts are only to diverge from that default if it is certain that the patent applicant 
really did not surrender the equivalent, which does require departure from 
considering solely the public record.214 
A similar line of analysis is seen in a non-patent, yet patent-related, decision by 
the Supreme Court. In TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.,215 the 
Supreme Court explored the intersection of patent and trademark law, specifically 
reviewing whether the existence of a utility patent precluded the use of the design 
of an article as source-identifying trade dress.216 Eschewing a bright-line rule that 
                                                                                                                 
during patent prosecution is irrelevant to any subsequent estoppel.”). 
 209. 535 U.S. 722 (2002). 
 210. Id. at 740. 
 211. Id. at 740−41. 
 212. Id.  
 213. Id. at 741. 
 214. See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 344 F.3d 1359, 1369 
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 215. 532 U.S. 23 (2001). 
 216. Id. at 29. 
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would preclude trademark protection if the good was covered by a patent, the Court 
instead created an evidentiary presumption:  
A utility patent is strong evidence that the features therein claimed are 
functional. If trade dress protection is sought for those features the 
strong evidence of functionality based on the previous patent adds great 
weight to the statutory presumption that features are deemed functional 
until proved otherwise by the party seeking trade dress protection. 
Where the expired patent claimed the features in question, one who 
seeks to establish trade dress protection must carry the heavy burden of 
showing that the feature is not functional, for instance by showing that 
it is merely an ornamental, incidental, or arbitrary aspect of the 
device.217 
The use of this approach emphasizes the policy that the contents of an expired 
patent generally are free to be copied by the public and thus ineligible for trade 
dress protection.218 Nevertheless, there are occasions when affording trade dress 
protection would be appropriate, notwithstanding the existence of the expired 
utility patent, if the feature is nonfunctional and the design serves a source-
identifying function.219 The use of the evidentiary presumption established the 
policy preference—free competition and copying—which could be altered in light 
of countervailing considerations.  
Thus, the lessons of the Supreme Court have shown that (1) the PHOSITA is an 
important consideration in patent law generally and (2) that the use of rebuttable 
presumptions are an appropriate way to balance competing policy concerns.220 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 217. Id. at 29−30. 
 218. Id. at 29. 
 219. Id. at 29–30; Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212–13 
(2000) (noting that a product design can serve as a trademark if it is source-identifying); see 
also In re Pennington Seed, Inc., 466 F.3d 1053, 1060 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (characterizing 
TrafFix holding as a “rebuttable presumption” of functionality). 
 220. Professor Lee advocates a different methodology, drawing on patent law’s 
enablement doctrine; Supreme Court decisions should enable any particular test or standard 
articulated. See Lee, supra note 4, at 63−71. My thesis could be viewed as a narrower form 
of this argument because a presumption-based approach seemingly would be enabling. 
Overall, however, Professor Lee’s proposal has one serious flaw. Enablement in patent law 
is based on the idea that the patent document is self-contained and self-referential—the 
specification must explain how to make and use the invention contained within the patent 
itself. A Supreme Court decision, and any rule articulated therein, must necessarily be of 
general applicability because it must be applied to unforeseen future cases. It is difficult to 
see how a singular Supreme Court decision could enable a court to readily decide a host of 
future cases involving ever-evolving technologies. Thus, the Supreme Court would have to 
write considerable dicta in order to guess what cases may come down the line. While 
Professor Lee’s insights are commendable, the proposed prescription is a bit unsatisfying. 
Another approach may be for the Supreme Court to take clusters of cases in a particular area 
with different factual contexts to create greater certainty around legal standards. See Carolyn 
Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging Versus Error Correction 
in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 313–27 (2006). To be fair, Professor 
Lee expressly disclaims offering any “substantive guidelines for determining when the 
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presumption establishes a default norm, which here would be the importance of the 
patent document and prosecution history. Only after a presumptive conclusion is 
reached would expert testimony be considered to determine if it is persuasive 
enough to overcome the intrinsic record. The use of the presumption, therefore, 
would require consideration of extrinsic evidence, which typically is the manner by 
which the views of the PHOSITA enter the calculus. The use of the presumption 
may also act as a counterbalance to overreliance on expert testimony, one risk when 
laypersons encounter technical information.221 
B. The Theories of Presumptions and Their Applicability to Patent Law 
The Supreme Court’s embrace of presumptions is quite fortuitous, even though 
the Court did not engage in a theoretical account of the use of presumptions in 
patent law, because they are an appropriate tool to balance the interest in notice 
with consideration of the technical or scientific. This section explores the 
theoretical basis for presumptions and explains why they are appropriate in the 
realm of patent law.  
Presumptions used in the law generally reflect social or policy choices that the 
courts or legislatures want to emphasize.222 Commentators have identified a 
number of reasons why the use of presumptions arise, including a reflection of the 
probability of causation or to force a party to disclose information that it is more 
likely to possess.223 In a sense, the presumption establishes a default position that 
will stand absent the introduction of more information. 
Presumptions, while ubiquitous in the law,224 vary widely in application.225 
Indeed, the use of the term “presumption” has been inexact in the law.226 No single 
rule is able to capture the entire universe of what courts and legislatures have 
                                                                                                                 
Supreme Court should intervene in patent affairs.” Lee, supra note 4, at 76. In contrast, the 
proposals in this article do seek to offer such guidance to both the Supreme Court and the 
Federal Circuit.  
 221. See Lee, supra note 4, at 24−25. 
 222. See Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions in Civil Actions Reconsidered, 66 IOWA L. REV. 
843, 845 (1981); Kenneth S. Broun, The Unfulfillable Promise of One Rule for All 
Presumptions, 62 N.C. L. REV. 697, 702 (1984); Mason Ladd, Presumptions in Civil Actions, 
1977 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 275, 279; cf. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 
209 (1973) (“This burden-shifting principle is not new or novel. There are no hard-and-fast 
standards governing the allocation of the burden of proof in every situation. The issue, 
rather, ‘is merely a question of policy and fairness based on experience in the different 
situations.’” (quoting 9 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2486, at 275 (3d ed. 1940))). 
 223. See Allen, supra note 222, at 845 (“[Presumptions] have been used to construct rules 
of decision to avoid factual impasse at trial; to allocate burdens of persuasion; to instruct the 
jury on the relationship between facts; and to allocate burdens of production.”); Ladd, supra 
note 222, at 280−81. 
 224. Antonio E. Bernardo, Eric Talley & Ivo Welch, A Theory of Legal Presumptions, 16 
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1, 2 (2000).  
 225. See Ladd, supra note 222, at 277 (“Courts and legislatures often carelessly use the 
term ‘presumption.’”); see also Broun, supra note 222, at 703 (exploring “bursting bubble” 
presumptions versus presumptions that shift the burden of proof).  
 226. Professor Allen advocated for eliminating the use of the term “presumption.” Allen, 
supra note 222, at 864. 
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dubbed “presumptions.”227 For example, issued patents are presumed valid,228 but 
this presumption merely establishes that the accused infringer bears the burden of 
proving invalidity as an affirmative defense.229 Thus, the use of the term 
presumption does little work, as it simply defines invalidity as an affirmative 
defense.230 
In other contexts, the term “presumption” is used to describe the shift of the 
burden of proof only if certain factual predicates can be demonstrated. The tort 
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, for instance, permits a jury to presume the negligence 
of the defendant if the plaintiff can show that  
(a) the event is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence 
of negligence;  
(b) other responsible causes, including the conduct of the plaintiff and 
third persons, are sufficiently eliminated by the evidence; and  
(c) the indicated negligence is within the scope of the defendant’s duty 
to the plaintiff.231 
                                                                                                                 
 
 227. Broun, supra note 222, at 697−98. Part of the problem with finding a uniform rule is 
that various policy concerns reflected in the presumption may need to be treated differently 
given the context, creating variations in the ways in which presumptions function. Id. at 708. 
 228. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006). 
 229. Allen, supra note 222, at 849−50 (objecting to use of term “presumption” in this 
context). Not all courts agreed with this view of the presumption of validity, however. 
Before the Federal Circuit was created, some courts treated the presumption of validity as 
merely shifting the burden of production to the defendant and, once that burden was 
satisfied, the presumption of validity disappeared under a “bursting bubble” approach. See 
Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 519 F.2d 708, 713 (6th Cir. 1975) (“The issuance 
of letters by the Patent Office, because of the statutory presumption of validity, makes a 
prima facie case for a plaintiff asserting the validity of his patent. This presumption has no 
independent evidentiary value, however, but only serves to place the burden of proof on a 
party who asserts invalidity. As the Supreme Court pointed out in Del Vecchio v. Bowers, 
296 U.S. 280 (1935), a statutory presumption ‘falls out of a case’ when the party against 
whom the presumption works meets his burden of offering evidence sufficient to justify a 
contrary finding.” (citation omitted) (emphasis in original)); Ronald J. Allen, Presumptions, 
Inferences and Burden of Proof in Federal Civil Actions—An Anatomy of Unnecessary 
Ambiguity and a Proposal for Reform, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 892, 897 n.26 (1982) 
(characterizing Sperberg as dealing with burden of production). 
 230. The Federal Circuit has used the statutory presumption to require proof of invalidity 
by clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Iovate Health Scis., Inc. v. Bio-Engineered 
Supplements & Nutrition, Inc., 586 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009). But see generally 
Doug Lichtman & Mark A. Lemley, Rethinking Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 
STAN. L. REV. 45 (2007) (arguing that the clear and convincing standard is not appropriate if 
the asserted prior art was not before the PTO). The Supreme Court will address this issue in 
the October 2010 term. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., No. 10-290, 2010 WL 3392402 (U.S. 
Nov. 29, 2010). The question presented is “[w]hether the court of appeals erred in holding 
that Microsoft’s invalidity defense must be proved by clear and convincing evidence.” 
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd., No. 10-290 (U.S. Aug. 27, 
2010), 2010 WL 3413088, at *ii. 
 231. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328D (1965); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & 
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Patent law has a similar burden-shifting provision, dealing with the proof of 
infringement for patented processes.232 If the patent holder can demonstrate both 
that “a substantial likelihood exists that the product was made by the patented 
process” and “that the plaintiff has made a reasonable effort to determine the 
process actually used in the production of the product and was unable to so 
determine,” then the burden shifts to the accused infringer to prove the product was 
not produced by the patented process.233 In these circumstances, the presumption 
acts as a tool to force the party who is in the better position to have the relevant 
information to divulge it.234 In the patent context, the accused infringer will know 
what process it utilizes more readily than the patentee, particularly if that process is 
performed overseas,235 limiting the patentee’s ability to obtain discovery. These 
presumptions can result in a shifting of the entire burden of proof (including both 
the burden of production and persuasion) or only one aspect (typically the burden 
of production).  
Presumptions may not need to even shift these evidentiary burdens to have the 
effect of eliciting more information. The presumption-like framework in TrafFix 
does not change the burden in any sense because the trademark owner at all times 
bears the burden of proving the validity of the trade dress; nevertheless, if the 
accused infringer can demonstrate the existence of a utility patent, the party 
asserting the trade dress must come forward with additional evidence to 
demonstrate that the design is nonfunctional.236 The prosecution history 
                                                                                                                 
Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285, 286−87 (2008) (referring to res 
ipsa loquitur as a presumption); see generally David Kaye, Probability Theory Meets Res 
Ipsa Loquitur, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1456 (1979). There is variation among the states as to 
whether the presumption of the res ipsa rule is permissive, allowing the jury to find 
negligence, or mandatory, shifting the burden of production to the defendant. See Broun, 
supra note 222, at 699. 
 232. See 35 U.S.C. § 295 (2006). This burden shifting appears to be a mandatory 
presumption. 
 233. Id. This presumption is required by the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property (TRIPS), although the U.S. statutory provision permissibly differs from 
the TRIPS article. TRIPS Article 34 permits the burden shift if either the product of the 
process is new or “if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by 
the process and the owner of the patent has been unable through reasonable efforts to 
determine the process actually used.” Article 34 only requires signatories to adopt one of 
these conditions, and the United States has adopted only the latter. Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, art. 34, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE 
RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 320 (1999), 
1869 U.N.T.S. 299, 33 I.L.M. 1197 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement] (“Members shall 
provide, in at least one of the following circumstances, that any identical product when 
produced without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to the 
contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the patented process.” (emphasis added)).  
 234. Cf. Ladd, supra note 222, at 281. 
 235. Such a scenario can arise because it is an act of infringement to import the product 
of a patented process, even if the process is performed overseas. 35 U.S.C. § 271(g) (2006); 
see Holbrook, Extraterritoriality, supra note 189, at 2139−41, 2148−50. 
 236. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 30 (2001); see, e.g., 
Great Neck Saw Mfrs., Inc. v. Star Asia U.S.A., LLC, No. C06-647Z, 2010 WL 2949296, at 
*16 (W.D. Wash. July 23, 2010). 
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presumptions play a similar, information-forcing role. Although the patent holder at 
all times bears the burden of proving infringement, the Warner-Jenkinson and 
Festo presumptions require the patentee to produce additional evidence in order to 
rebut them.237 In these contexts, the presumption operates as a litigation-based 
information forcing tool.238 
Thus, in the patent context, two key aspects of presumptions are important. The 
first is using the presumption to implement a policy choice: the default position is 
often determined through consideration of a policy preference that the courts or the 
legislatures want to implement.239 In patent law, both the Federal Circuit and the 
Supreme Court have noted that the important policy of public notice is served by 
favoring the publicly available intrinsic evidence.240 This choice reflects the interest 
in certainty that is important to the proper functioning of any property regime. 
Thus, reliance on the intrinsic evidence should create a presumptive conclusion. 
The conclusion reached from consideration of the intrinsic evidence, however, can 
be rebutted through consideration of extrinsic, technical information. The 
presumption, therefore, not only works to effect public notice and certainty but also 
ensures a modicum of flexibility. 
The second reason why presumptions are appropriate in the context of the 
treatment of the patent document is the information-forcing function they create. 
Patent applicants do have incentives to withhold certain information and behave 
strategically, in part due to concerns over competition and in part due to concerns 
over the legal consequences their disclosures may create.241 As to the former, patent 
applicants have the incentive to disclose “just enough” to satisfy the patentability 
requirements of § 112 while retaining other aspects as trade secrets.242 As to the 
latter, the Federal Circuit’s treatment of the patent document gives an incentive for 
patent applicants to limit their disclosures to avoid potential estoppel-like 
consequences. Of course, the court’s written description and enablement 
jurisprudence put applicants in a bit of a catch-22: you must disclose even that 
which the PHOSITA knows, yet overdisclosure risks surrendering claim scope 
during the claim construction process. Nevertheless, given that the patentee is more 
likely to have information relevant to an understanding of the patent document, the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 237. One could frame these scenarios more concretely in terms of a presumption 
framework. Under TrafFix, the accused infringer could be viewed as having the burden of 
producing the utility patent and showing that the asserted trade dress is covered by the 
patent; the burden of production then shifts back to the trademark owner. Similarly, the 
accused infringer bears the burden of producing evidence that a narrowing amendment was 
made during prosecution of the relevant patent. The burden of production then shifts to the 
patent holder to show that the amendment was made for a reason unrelated to patentability, 
that the amendment bore only a tangential relationship to the asserted equivalent, or that the 
equivalent was unforeseeable.  
 238. Allen, supra note 222, at 860.  
 239. See Broun, supra note 222, at 702. 
 240. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 727 (2002); 
Warner-Jenkinson Co., v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 29–30 (1997); Vitronics 
Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1584 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
 241. See supra notes 163–66 and accompanying text.  
 242. See supra note 163 and accompanying text.  
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use of presumptions to create defaults can force the patentee to divulge additional 
information to the court or risk the loss of patent scope or the invalidation of the 
patent claim.  
C. The Use of Rebuttable Presumptions Can Help Balance the  
Legal and Technical Nature of the Patent Document 
Generally presumptions can be used to establish a default position that can be 
shifted in light of additional evidence. In the context of patent law, that preference 
is to emphasize the primacy of the patent document and the prosecution history, the 
intrinsic evidence.243 Determinations of claim construction or the sufficiency of the 
patent’s disclosure should, in the main, be determined by that primarily legal 
evidence. That default position, however, can be altered by consideration of 
extrinsic evidence, which can explain the technical component. The following 
subsection advocates and elaborates the use of presumptions in claim construction, 
written description, and enablement law. 
1. Intrinsic Evidence in Claim Construction Should Create a  
Presumptive Interpretation, Rebuttable by the Extrinsic Evidence 
The lessons of the Supreme Court’s decisions, and the theoretical justifications 
of presumptions as promoting certain norms and policies, shows that the Federal 
Circuit has gone too far in its claim construction jurisprudence. Under the current 
regime, claim construction operates in a manner akin to the absolute bar approach 
to prosecution history estoppel rejected by the Supreme Court in Festo.244 As the 
Federal Circuit stated in Vitronics, reliance on the extrinsic evidence is 
inappropriate if the intrinsic evidence is unambiguous.245 In other words, the 
extrinsic evidence cannot be used to contradict the clear teachings of the intrinsic 
evidence. If the intrinsic evidence generates a certain meaning to the claim term, 
that definition governs regardless of what the extrinsic evidence may suggest.  
This methodology is in essence an irrebuttable presumption, akin to the absolute 
bar of prosecution history estoppel that the Supreme Court rejected. The most 
appropriate time to consider the extrinsic evidence, contrary to Vitronics, would be 
when it truly conflicts or is in tension with the intrinsic evidence because it 
suggests a technologist might read the language differently than a lawyer. The 
elevation of the patent document is a bit surprising in that the court appears to 
assume that the patent applicant has somehow perfectly described or represented 
the nature of the invention.246 Such an assumption is flawed on a number of levels. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 243. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1318–19 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc).  
 244. See Festo, 535 U.S. at 737. 
 245. Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1583; see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1324 (“In Vitronics, we did 
not attempt to provide a rigid algorithm for claim construction, but simply attempted to 
explain why, in general, certain types of evidence are more valuable than others. Today, we 
adhere to that approach and reaffirm the approach to claim construction outlined in that 
case . . . .”). 
 246. Cf. Festo, 535 U.S. at 738 (“It does not follow, however, that the amended claim 
becomes so perfect in its description that no one could devise an equivalent. After 
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To begin, there is no requirement for the inventor to actually be ordinarily skilled in 
the art: she could be over- or under-skilled. Thus assuming the PHOSITA would 
take the specification as scientifically accurate seems incorrect.247 The PHOSITA 
could read language of surrender far differently from a scientific perspective than a 
legal one because she might recognize technical errors in the disclosure or might 
weigh the importance of the disclosure differently.248 The patent applicant can even 
be wrong about why the invention works, so long as she nevertheless teaches how 
to make and use it.249 Thus, as a technological matter, there is no reason to assume 
that the disclosure should be the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the claim. 
Instead, the intrinsic evidence should create a presumptive interpretation, 
rebuttable by extrinsic evidence.250 This would play out in practice by focusing on 
the burden of proof. As the burden of proof lies with the patentee in proving 
infringement, the burden of persuasion at all times would remain with the patentee. 
If the intrinsic evidence supports the patentee’s interpretation, the burden of 
production would shift to the accused infringer to produce extrinsic evidence to 
contradict the construction afforded the claim from the intrinsic evidence. Absent 
any such evidence, the claim construction would stand. If the accused infringer 
came forward with such evidence, the patentee would need to come forward with 
her own extrinsic evidence to carry the burden of persuasion.251 
                                                                                                                 
amendment, as before, language remains an imperfect fit for invention.”). 
 247. Cf. Kelly Casey Mullally, Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim 
Construction, 59 FLA. L. REV. 333, 367−68 (2007) (arguing that reliance on intrinsic 
evidence alone risks reducing notice and certainty because of lack of technical context).  
 248. See, e.g., Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 212 F.3d 1377, 1382 
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[T]he extrinsic evidence invoked by PowerTrax to show a potential issue 
of fact relating to the importance of the reliability issue does not trump the clear disclosures 
and assertions in the patent itself.”); Vehicular Techs. Corp. v. Titan Wheel Int’l, Inc., 141 
F.3d 1084, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“This new and absolute rule is 
presented by the majority as rendering irrelevant any evidence of insubstantiality of the 
differences, or sameness of function/way/result, with reference to the function described in 
claim clause [5] . . . . The importance of a property mentioned in the specification is a fact to 
be found and weighed. It is improper to foreclose such evidence by ruling that every 
unclaimed advantage must be present, whatever its relative significance in practice.”).  
 249. Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consol. Rubber Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428, 435−36 (1911) (“It 
is certainly not necessary that he understand or be able to state the scientific principles 
underlying his invention, and it is immaterial whether he can stand a successful examination 
as to the speculative ideas involved.”); Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581−82 (Fed. 
Cir. 1989) (“While it is not a requirement of patentability that an inventor correctly set forth, 
or even know, how or why the invention works, neither is the patent applicant relieved of the 
requirement of teaching how to achieve the claimed result, even if the theory of operation is 
not correctly explained or even understood.” (citations omitted)). 
 250. The use of extrinsic evidence could elevate the role of expert testimony in claim 
construction prepared in anticipation of litigation and the concern of “hired guns” that do not 
help elucidate the meaning of the claims. See, e.g., Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1318; Vitronics, 90 
F.3d at 1585. As the Supreme Court noted, however, in most cases, credibility and other 
concerns with experts should be subsumed in the entirety of the claim construction process. 
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389 (1996). Moreover, if the expert 
testimony is in equipoise or otherwise unclear, than the presumptive interpretation afforded 
by the intrinsic evidence would control, mitigating this concern.  
 251. Importantly, this approach also differs from contract interpretation, which has been 
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On the other hand, if the intrinsic evidence supported the construction offered by 
the accused infringer, then the patentee would have both the burden of production 
and persuasion of providing extrinsic evidence contradicting the interpretation 
provided by the intrinsic evidence. As the burden of proof remains with the 
patentee, the accused infringer theoretically could stand on the intrinsic evidence 
alone, although such reliance as a strategic matter would be ill-advised. 
There may be occasions when a patent applicant wants to guarantee a particular 
definition or meaning for a term contained with the patent. In such a circumstance, 
the applicant should act as a lexicographer and provide an explicit definition for the 
term.252 By providing an express definition, this would inform both a lawyer and a 
technologist as to what the term means, limiting the inquiry to that definition alone. 
In contrast, courts would no longer be permitted to use implicit definitions through 
disavowals to narrow claim scope without first considering whether a technologist 
would view such language in the specification or prosecution history as disclaiming 
the relevant subject matter.253  
The Federal Circuit has articulated a variety of “presumptions” in the context of 
claim construction. For example, claims that use different language are 
presumptively of different scope.254 Similarly, the use of the term “means” in a 
claim creates a presumption that the applicant intends to evoke “means-plus-
function” claiming as governed by 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6;255 conversely, failure to 
use the term “means” creates a presumption against interpreting the claim as a 
“means-plus-function” claim.256  
These presumptions, however, are not the same type as those articulated in this 
article. Use of these presumptions is a bit perplexing. Presumptions are helpful in 
giving preference to certain types of evidence, which reflects certain normative or 
                                                                                                                 
advanced as an appropriate analogy to claim construction. See Markman v. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 997–98 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (Mayer, J., concurring) (arguing for 
contract-like analysis, with intrinsic evidence treated as legal and extrinsic evidence as 
factual), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370 (1996). In contract interpretation, resort to parole evidence is 
appropriate only if the contract language itself is ambiguous. See, e.g., Thomsen v. Famous 
Dave’s of Am., Inc., 606 F.3d 905, 908 (8th Cir. 2010) (applying Minnesota law); Addicks 
Services, Inc. v. GGP-Bridgeland, LP, 596 F.3d 286, 294 (5th Cir. 2010) (applying Texas 
law). In claim interpretation, however, more than the patent applicant’s intent is relevant; 
instead, it is that of the exogenous, objective PHOSITA. Thus, the contract analogy also 
fails.  
 252. See Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1316 (“[O]ur cases recognize that the specification may 
reveal a special definition given to a claim term by the patentee that differs from the meaning 
it would otherwise possess. In such cases, the inventor’s lexicography governs.”); Markman, 
52 F.3d at 980 (“As we have often stated, a patentee is free to be his own lexicographer.”); 
cf. Miller, supra note 44, at 203–07 (advocating requiring lexicon and preferred dictionary 
sections in patents to guide definitions).  
 253. See supra notes 72–78 and accompanying text.  
 254. This canon of claim construction is known as claim differentiation. See Curtiss-
Wright Flow Control Corp. v. Velan, Inc., 438 F.3d 1374, 1380–81 (Fed. Cir. 2006) 
(discussing doctrine’s applicability to not only independent and dependent claims but also to 
two independent claims). 
 255. See, e.g., Welker Bearing Co. v. PHD, Inc., 550 F.3d 1090, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
 256. E.g., CCS Fitness v. Brunswick Corp., 288 F.3d 1359, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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policy preferences.257 In the above examples, the only evidence that is relevant in 
assessing these presumptions is the intrinsic evidence—the patent itself. Indeed, it 
seems strange to speak of these presumptions in an inquiry that is entirely a legal 
analysis.258 While arguably these presumptions might create a hierarchy as to which 
part of the intrinsic evidence is more relevant, ultimately the court will decide what 
the intrinsic evidence means. Even the court has recognized that these 
presumptions are more “rules of thumb” as opposed to presumptions that help 
govern the relevancy and weight of other evidence, such as how to appropriately 
weigh the intrinsic versus the extrinsic evidence.259 Thus, these various 
presumptions in the canons of claim construction are a bit perplexing and really do 
not appear to be true “presumptions” in the evidentiary sense.  
 One corollary to the use of presumptions in claim construction is that it 
undermines the current status of claim construction as purely legal. Courts are in 
the business of construing legal documents but not technical ones. These 
technological considerations, and the presumptions surrounding them, would 
inevitably be factual in nature, suggesting that the current regime of de novo review 
of claim construction would need to be rejected.260 
2. A Disclosure of a Limited Number of Species or a Teaching Away  
Should Create a Presumption of Failure of Written Description or Enablement, 
Rebuttable by Extrinsic Evidence 
In a manner akin to claim construction, the Federal Circuit has essentially 
foreclosed consideration of the views of the PHOSITA from assessing the 
adequacy of a patent’s disclosure under both the written description and 
enablement inquiries. Aside from being inconsistent with the clear language of 
§ 112,261 it creates significant costs to patent drafters to include information that the 
PHOSITA would know and places them in the odd position of attempting to guess 
what future litigants may use against them. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 257. See Broun, supra note 222, at 702. 
 258. Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1454−56 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (en 
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 259. Edwards Lifesciences LLC v. Cook Inc., 582 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2009) 
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yet afford deference to fact finding relevant to claim construction on appeal.  
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Instead of using the patent disclosure exclusively, the court should establish 
presumptions based on the disclosure, subject to rebuttal by extrinsic evidence.262 
Consultation of the specification would create a presumption that disclosure is 
insufficient, subject to rebuttal by extrinsic evidence. Of course, the posture of 
written description and enablement challenges in the court is strikingly different 
than issues of claim construction because the accused infringer bears the burden of 
proving the claim is invalid.263 As a result, the Federal Circuit’s reliance 
exclusively on the patent disclosure alone in these cases is particularly troublesome 
given that the Patent Office has reviewed the disclosure and found it sufficient, 
which is the reason for the statutory presumption.264 
A presumption-based methodology can take into account the statutory 
presumption of validity, as can be seen from the Federal Circuit’s approach for 
assessing whether a party other than the patentee was the first to invent under 35 
U.S.C. § 102(g)(2).265 Generally, under U.S. patent law, the first person to invent is 
entitled to a patent; the exception, however, is if that person abandoned, 
suppressed, or concealed it.266 In those circumstances, then the second-to-invent 
can be awarded the patent.267 In the litigation context, this issue arises when an 
accused infringer challenges the validity of the patent by asserting that someone 
else was the first to invent (often times the accused infringer herself).268 The 
patentee’s response is often that the alleged first to invent abandoned, suppressed, 
or concealed the invention, negating their status as the first to invent and preserving 
the validity of the patent.269 In order to sort out these various positions and to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 262. Professor Seymore has offered a slightly different burden-shifting methodology for 
use in the USPTO. See Seymore, Heightened Enablement, supra note 3, at 156−57. His 
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 268. See, e.g., Apotex, 254 F.3d at 1035–36.  
 269. See, e.g., id. at 1036 (arguing that Apotex’s patent is not invalid because, although 
Merck was the first-to-invent, it suppressed the invention); cf. Young v. Dworkin, 489 F.2d 
1277, 1281–82 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (awarding patent to the second-to-invent because the first-
to-invent suppressed the invention).  
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account for the presumption of validity that attends an issued patent, the Federal 
Circuit articulated the following presumption-based framework: 
[O]nce a challenger of a patent has proven by clear and convincing 
evidence that “the invention was made in this country by another 
inventor,” 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), the burden of production shifts to the 
patentee to produce evidence sufficient to create a genuine issue of 
material fact as to whether the prior inventor has suppressed or 
concealed the invention. However, in accordance with the statutory 
presumption in 35 U.S.C. § 282, the ultimate burden of persuasion 
remains with the party challenging the validity of the patent. Once the 
patentee has satisfied its burden of production, the party alleging 
invalidity under § 102(g) must rebut any alleged suppression or 
concealment with clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.270 
In the context of assessing the sufficiency of the patent’s disclosure, a 
presumption approach could work similarly. If the court considers the specification 
to be inadequate, then the burden of coming forward would shift to the patentee to 
produce evidence to create a genuine issue regarding the sufficiency of the patent’s 
disclosure. The ultimate burden of proving the patent claim invalid for lack of 
written description or enablement would remain with the accused infringer. On the 
other hand, if the court views the specification as adequate, then the accused 
infringer would be presented with the daunting task of demonstrating that the 
extrinsic evidence shows the inadequacy of the disclosure. In this scenario, the 
presumption would buttress the presumption of validity, making demonstration of 
invalidity rather difficult. The patentee would have no obligation to come forward 
with any additional evidence. It would be a rare case where the party challenging 
the patent’s validity would be successful if the patent document alone is viewed as 
sufficient.  
The presumption expresses the norm in favor of disclosures and the public 
record but allows supplementation of evidence of the PHOSITA. This approach 
seems particularly appropriate given the hindsight advantage that subsequent 
readers of a patent might have. Patentees would not be entirely handcuffed by 
disclosures made years before, particularly if the PHOSITA at the time would have 
had such knowledge within her grasp.  
With respect to the written description requirement, for a broad generic claim, 
the failure to disclose multiple species or other functional considerations that would 
teach that one could extrapolate readily from a narrower disclosure would create a 
presumption that the disclosure has not placed the public in possession of the 
invention. At that point, the court would consider evidence of the knowledge of the 
PHOSITA to determine if the representations made in the specification are accurate 
as a technological matter.  
A similar analysis would apply in the enablement context. Indeed, the Federal 
Circuit in Liebel-Flarsheim271 came close to adopting this approach. There, the 
specification taught away from a particular embodiment (which of course was the 
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accused device).272 The court then also considered extrinsic evidence to determine 
whether the claims were enabled.273 In essence, the court was using a presumption-
like framework: the specification contained a teaching away from a given 
embodiment, creating a presumption that the full scope of the claim was not 
enabled. Consultation of extrinsic evidence confirmed that the claim was not fully 
enabled.274 Although the court did not use the language of presumptions, the 
methodology used in Liebel-Flarsheim demonstrates how such a presumption could 
work. Instead, however, the Federal Circuit’s law evolved into the written 
description-like approaches of Automotive Technologies, Sitrick, and ALZA, which 
inappropriately discount extrinsic evidence.  
D. Possible Disadvantages of the Presumption-Based Approach 
The proposed presumption-based methodology affords a way of balancing the 
interest in certainty and notice provided by giving primacy to the patent document, 
while providing a safety valve through the necessary admission of extrinsic 
evidence to ensure that the patent is given its appropriate, technological import. 
This approach depends, of course, on the courts actually respecting the method.  
One potential outcome is that the courts would articulate such presumptions yet 
never find the extrinsic evidence compelling enough to rebut the clear teachings of 
the patent. Given the tendency for people to rely on heuristics when engaging 
technological information, such an intuition may flow naturally. Moreover, to the 
extent that the Federal Circuit would seek to retain control over doctrine, it may be 
reticent to relinquish some of its power of review on appeal.275 
Nevertheless, the presumption-based approach would require the courts to 
readily consider the technological evidence in lieu of simply precluding it. The 
process of analyzing the evidence hopefully would add greater transparency to the 
judicial process and force the courts to engage with the relevant technological facts.  
CONCLUSION 
The public notice function of patents is undeniably important. The Federal 
Circuit’s preoccupation with this function, therefore, is entirely understandable. 
Unfortunately, the methodology that they have used in the context of claim 
construction, written description, and enablement, is flawed because it fails to 
adequately account for the technical aspect of the patent document and how that 
knowledge can impact the meaning of the terms contained therein. The use of 
presumptions, as advocated in this Article, provides a reasonable manner to balance 
the interest in certainty afforded by the intrinsic evidence with considerations of the 
technical. Those in the “real world,” and not in litigation, would avail themselves 
of this information, which the Federal Circuit’s current approach generally ignores, 
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to the detriment of the patent system.276 In this way, the technical aspect of the 
patent is preserved and recognized, while giving an appropriate level of deference 
to the publicly available information.  
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